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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the issue of the growing threat of transnational 
criminal gangs spreading throughout the Central America and the United States 
(U.S.).  More specifically, the thesis addresses the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) 
gang, examining how this particular gang emerged as a formidable public 
security threat.  A common misconception holds transnational gangs like MS-13 
emerged in Central America; however, the truth is these gangs have their origins 
in the gang lifestyle found in the U.S.  Since the early 1990’s, MS-13 and similar 
transnational gangs have established criminal networks specializing in drug, 
arms, goods, and human smuggling.  These operations pose a grave threat to 
U.S. national security: intelligence reports surfaced in 2004 indicating a possible 
meeting between an al-Qaeda lieutenant and members of MS-13.  Due to these 
reports, U.S. agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement are among the agencies that have 
started to work closely in monitoring transnational gang activity in the U.S. and 
the western hemisphere region.  While MS-13 does not hold any anti-American 
sentiment, the gang will work with the highest bidder without hesitation.  
Therefore, the thesis addresses the organized crime-terrorist organization debate 
within the academic and intelligence communities, adding how globalization 
serves to facilitate such a link.  The thesis helps to explain how current Central 
American legislation is forcing transnational gangs to go “underground” in order 
to survive.  Findings show the need to switch towards a more multi-faceted 
strategy in order to ensure long-term solutions to the proliferation of transnational 
gangs not obtainable with current heavy-handed methods while concurrently 
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I. THE LIKELIHOOD OF COOPERATION  
A. THE THREAT OF RISING CRIME 
For much of the twentieth century, Central American countries have faced 
socio-economic and political adversities that have challenged the legitimacy of 
their governments.  During the first half of this century, authoritarian regimes 
ruled throughout the region, often presiding over state-controlled economies 
structured to develop their respective nations.  States industrialized at the 
expense of the rural sectors.  The resulting inequality and marginalization 
brought about political violence as early as the 1930’s, and in at least two 
countries, spawned socialist-based insurgencies that would continue well into the 
1980’s.   
Central American countries for the most part have enjoyed a democratic 
existence since the 1990’s.  Implementation of austere fiscal reforms aimed a 
stabilizing markets while preparing them for international competition, however, 
tested the legitimacy of these nascent democracies.  Government legitimacy 
once again came into question as political violence remerged in the form of 
protests carried out by members of losing economic sectors.  In addition to the 
hardship caused by much needed economic reforms, governments also face a 
by-product of this economic adversity that threatens to hinder further economic 
growth: crime.  
Criminal activity has been steadily increasing throughout Central America 
at a rate that not only threatens economic growth, but regional security and 
democratic development as well.  Of particular importance to this thesis is the 
topic of Central American gang violence, which has extended from a 




1980’s.1  These transnational gangs have gained prominence through their 
exploitation of illicit networks, manipulation of technology, and its absence of 
loyalty to any particular country.   
These characteristics, when combined with a drive for profiteering by any 
means necessary, creates a scenario for where transnational gangs may liberally 
collaborate with any organization that will readily pay.  Mexican drug cartels, for 
example, have used these violent individuals as hired guns to provide security or 
strong-arm their competition.   The lack of loyalty to country found within these 
transnational criminal gangs presents a nascent threat to United States (U.S.) 
national security.  While there is no specific evidence of an existing link, the 
opportunity for interaction between transnational gangs and Islamic terrorist 
organizations may develop due to characteristics inherent to these gangs’ 
structural organization, their lack of loyalty to any country and their established 
criminal networks that stretch from Central America into the U.S.     
This thesis seeks to answer the question:  what is the likelihood Central 
American-based transnational criminal gang will collaborate with Islamic terrorist 
organizations?  The research will attempt to find out what a partnership between 
these two entities do to the security of a region already overwhelmed by violent 
crime.  By analyzing the regional conditions and motivations, the thesis examines 
what specific operations the two groups may collaborate in throughout the 
western hemisphere.  Pursuing research into this topic will allow the reader to 
understand the implications for both U.S. National and Central America regional 
security as a result of collusion between western hemisphere transnational gangs 
and Islamic terrorist organizations. 
B. ATTRACTION TO TRANSNATIONAL GANGS 
The regional criminal networks transnational gangs operate in the western 
hemisphere are potentially attractive to terrorist organizations that wish to employ 
one of their many “services.”  One example exists in the diverse smuggling 
                                            
1  USAID Bureau for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs Office of Regional Sustainable 
Development, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment (Washington D.C.: United States 
Agency for International Development,[2006]). 
3 
operations controlled by these transnational criminal organizations that 
encompass well-established drug, arms, and human smuggling networks.  
Through violence and intimidation, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), for example, 
controls considerable portions of Southern Mexico’s railways used for 
transporting smuggled goods and people.2  Those who desire to use this illegal 
entryway into the U.S. would in effect have to contact the transnational gang in 
order to transit through the area on its way into or out of the U.S.    
The targeting of “soft-targets” within the region presents itself as another 
opportunity for terrorists to seek the assistance of transnational gangs.  In the 
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks by al-Qaeda, it has been widely 
publicized that Islamic terrorists may be recruiting non-Arab operatives to carry 
out acts against the interests of the U.S. and its allies.  Recruitment of individuals 
of non-Arab backgrounds in both the U.S. and Europe has become critical to 
terrorists’ agendas in recent years, as these potential recruits do not fit 
established terrorist profiles.  The Islamic missionary group Tablighi Jammat 
serves as an example of the validity of this claim.   
Tablighi Jammat travels the world seeking out wayward Muslims as well 
as new converts.  While group leadership objects to the use of violence or 
alleged terrorist connections, U.S. authorities are not dissuaded from 
investigating the group.  A main reason for such scrutiny is due to the group’s 
connection with John Walker Lindh – the “American Taliban.”  In 1999, Lindh met 
with Tablighi Jammat missionaries that encouraged him to join them in their 
travels.  Lindh allegedly sought additional understanding of the Muslim faith 
during his travels with the missionary group.  At the insistence of a Tablighi 
Jammat preacher, Lindh enrolled in a Pakistani religious school.  It is from this 
                                            
2  Carlos Mauricio Cruz, "Al-Qaeda's Unlikely Allies in Central America," Terrorism Monitor 3, 
no. 1 (January 2005), 3-5, 
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=411&issue_id=3196&article_id=2
369091 (accessed May 16, 2006). 
4 
school where Lindh allegedly made contact with the Taliban.3  Another event that 
serves as justification for the continued surveillance of the Tablighi Jammat took 
place last year in Great Britain.  In August 2006, Scotland Yard arrested terrorists 
planning to bomb multiple flights out of London’s Heathrow airport.  The arrests 
ultimately yielded 23 suspects – seven of which were Tablighi Jammat followers.4 
As with the London example, the individuals sought to assist in terrorist 
operations have an advantage in that they possess an understanding of their 
societies and customs that allow them to assimilate easily.5  Terrorist may 
therefore seek to employ local individuals to provide intelligence in preparation 
for an impending attack within the Americas.  Surveillance of a U.S. or allied 
embassy, and economic investments of the same, for example, may be easier if 
a native not fitting a terrorist profile executed the operation. 
This thesis looks at factors that produce an ideal setting for cooperation 
between these two actors. Consequently, it will attempt to point out indicators of 
possible collaboration, allowing U.S. and regional law enforcement agencies to 
react accordingly. In doing so, readers will be better equipped to implement 
measures aimed at preventing a promising environment while concurrently 
undoing established operational links. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW: AN OVERVIEW 
1. Organized Crime and Terrorist Organization Link Debate    
The subject of terrorism and organized crime linkages is not new; 
however, the 9/11 attack has forced authorities and scholars to view the topic in 
a different light.  Prior to the attack on the World Trade Center, scholars believed 
the likelihood of the two groups working together was low.  Given the asymmetric 
                                            
3 Susan Sachs, "A Muslim Missionary Group Draws New Scrutiny in U.S." New York Times, 
July 14, 2003, 
http://libproxy.nps.navy.mil/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?did=
358190431&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed September 15, 2006). 
4  Paul Lewis, "Inside the Tablighi Jamaat, a UK Islamic Group with a Mission," The 
Guardian, August 22, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardian/ (accessed September 15, 
2006). 
5  United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Terrorist Recruitment and Infiltration in 
the United States: Prisons and Military as an Operational Base, October 14, 2003, 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=960&wit_id=2719 (accessed June 12, 2006). 
5 
characteristics of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), though, traditional 
perceptions about the issue are slowly changing.  Dr. Moises Naim, editor-in-
chief of Foreign Policy magazine, credits globalization with shortening distances 
while concurrently expanding and strengthening economic relationships between 
nations.6  He also points out the “dark side” of this phenomenon, arguing new 
regulations and procedures currently in use around the world have created 
“loopholes” open to use by criminals.  In doing so, globalization has served as an 
enabler to the propagation of both criminal and terrorist networks. Given the 
mostly decentralized composition of terrorist and transnational criminal 
organizations, a globalized environment affords a promising setting for groups 
from either sector to conduct business.  Interaction between terrorists and 
criminals in such a situation, therefore, becomes easier.   
Two camps emerge when discussing the likelihood of a terrorists-
transnational criminal link in the western hemisphere.  The first camp bases its 
observations on historical accounts.  The root of this argument considers 
motivating factors as well as the type of operations conducted when terrorists 
turn to criminal activities.  The second absolutely refutes the possibility, believing 
differences in motivation between actors are too great to overcome.  As a result, 
this group limits any potential contact with criminal entities as a by-product of 
terrorist financing practices.     
a. “Cooperation is Likely” School of Thought  
Scholars in this first group acknowledge that state funding of 
terrorist operations significantly decreased at the end of the Cold War.  As the 
number of states who renounced the use of terrorism grew, established and 
emerging terrorist organizations lost government sponsors.  Consequently, 
terrorist organizations began to pursue other venues in order to supplant 
traditional state financial and logistical backing for on-going and future 
operations.  
                                            
6  Moises Naim, "The Five Wars of Globalization," Foreign Policy, no. 134 (January/February 
2003), 
http://libproxy.nps.navy.mil/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?did=
278453641&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed December 3, 2006). 
6 
Government officials, such as ex-Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Rand Beers, argue 
symbiotic relationship exits between terrorism and organized crime.  Criminals 
benefit from the military expertise and weapons access provided by terrorist 
organizations.  Meanwhile, terrorists also benefit from an established criminal 
network and access to consumers for illicit commodities.7        
Terrorists face benefits as well as assume risks when reverting to 
criminal activity as a source of fund raising.   On the one hand, by purchasing 
goods and services through the black market, terrorists reduce the risk of 
detection by authorities monitoring legal markets.  On the other hand, terrorist 
increase their risk of detection by authorities monitoring organized criminal 
activity.  The potential of getting caught rises with the number of different criminal 
enterprises terrorists choose to pursue.   
Terrorists have found different ways to avoid exposure.  For 
example, terrorists will first enter the criminal world through sectors that require 
little to no experience, such as kidnapping.  Then they will slowly work on gaining 
experience in a particular activity within a specific geographical area.  As a result, 
areas with little or weak law enforcement control become ideal for terrorist to 
hone criminal skills without any major risk of arrest.8  While the drug trade is 
arguably the most lucrative fund-raiser, it carries the highest risk.  Terrorist will 
attempt to vary their criminal involvement among low-risk operations such as 
credit card fraud and cigarette smuggling when seeking profits.   
Emerging logistical needs may also serve as another reason why 
terrorists may seek out the criminal underworld.  Terrorists may opt to employ 
existing criminal networks for services beyond their capabilities.  Such a structure 
may already be in place, thus removing the need for terrorists to create a system 
                                            
7  United States Senate Committee and Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, 
and Government Information, Narco-Terrorism: The Worldwide Connection between Drugs and 
Terror, March 13, 2002. 
8  John T. Picarelli and Louise I. Shelly, "Organized Crime and Terrorism" in Terrorism 
Financing and State Responses in Comparative Perspective, eds. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold 
A. Trinkunas (Palo Alto: Stanford University, 2007), 94-95. 
7 
from scratch.  One example is the shipment of weapons and counterfeit goods 
into the U.S. by using the same illicit-trade routes used by criminals.  Another 
example was the human smuggling rings based out of Mexico and Peru during 
the late 1990’s and early 2000’s.   
These particular smuggling rings specialized in the transport of 
Middle Easterners initially brought into Central or South America, through Mexico 
and into the U.S.  Fortunately, between 2003 and 2005, authorities in the region 
managed to break up these illicit rings.  Since the dismantling of these particular 
networks, Middle Easterners and Arabs have sought other similar rings.  One 
option is the human trafficking networks operated by the transnational criminal 
gangs in the region.  Although the majority of those being smuggled are Central 
and South Americans seeking a better life in the U.S., these types of networks 
remain attractive for terrorist use.9 
b. “Cooperation is Unlikely” School of Thought  
Another group of analysts calls into doubt the likelihood of a 
strategic alliance forming between terrorists and criminals in the western 
hemisphere.  Many in this group believe the different motivations driving terrorists 
and criminal groups present a major obstacle for collaboration.  Terrorists may 
refuse to work with criminal entities based on ideological motives.  While 
terrorists may involve themselves in minor criminal activities, their ultimate goal 
remains ideological.  Therefore, they will attempt to avoid anything that obstructs 
their beliefs.  One example of such behavior is the reluctance of Islamic terrorists 
to use state corruption to their advantage.  These individuals reject bribery as a 
violation of their principles.   The use of bribes would essentially mean the 
support of the same system they are combating.10 
A high level of law enforcement attention is enough to deter both 
sets of actors from interacting with each other.  On one hand, criminals may seek 
                                            
9  Thomas Davidson, "Terrorism and Human Smuggling Rings in South and Central 
America," Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 22 (November 17, 2005), 
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369832 (accessed May 16, 
2006). 
10  Picarelli and Shelly, Organized Crime and Terrorism, 101 
8 
to shun contact with terrorists in an attempt to avoid the consequent attention of 
counter-terrorist entities in addition to the traditional police agencies they 
normally evade.  Terrorists’ sole aim is to communicate their agenda to the world 
by any means necessary.  The sheer nature of their existence is to spread their 
political message to as many places as possible, raising public awareness to 
whatever may be their cause.  Consequently, these actions may bring undue 
attention to criminal organizations that prefer to operate in secrecy.  On the other, 
terrorists may want to avoid contact with criminals due to their high-profile 
lifestyle – particularly in the case of western hemisphere transnational gangs well 
known by law enforcement agencies at local and national levels.11   
Ultimately, critics hold operational goals pursued by terrorists and 
western hemisphere transnational criminals are too divergent to allow a 
partnership to emerge.  Western hemisphere transnational criminal groups do not 
have an anti-American agenda like Islamic terrorists.  While crimes taking place 
in Central America may be taking a more politically charged stance, such activity 
currently targets local governments.  In the 2004 attack on a Honduran bus by 
members of MS-13, for example, anti-gang legislation emerged as the main 
reason for the attack that claimed 28 passengers.  Nevertheless, money remains 
the primary motivator for transnational criminals.  Given the right price, the 
potential for assisting terrorist exists.12 
2. Western Hemisphere’s Transnational Gangs Problem 
Import substitution industrialization (ISI) became the leading economic 
development strategy immediately following World War II, lasting into the 1970’s.  
ISI perpetuated industrialization throughout the region at the cost of the rural 
sector.  This allowed for the emergence of unequal levels of protectionist 
measures among the economic sectors that favored the urban sector of society.  
As industrial growth flourished in the cities, agricultural growth dropped in the 
countryside due to the increasing taxation on exports. When primary exports 
failed to raise adequate levels of revenue, subsidies to the industrial sector hurt 
                                            
11  Cruz, Al-Qaeda's Unlikely Allies in Central America, 3-5 
12  Ibid. 
9 
the government budget.13  By the early 1970’s, countries still implementing ISI 
measures were characterized by economies unable to compete internationally.  
As a result, Latin America slowly shifted from the state-controlled system of ISI, 
to a more open market structure.   
With this economic liberalization process, Latin American countries began 
launching neo-liberal market reforms in the 1990’s. This economic restructuring 
called for austere measures aimed at ultimately preparing these financial 
systems to enter the international economic arena.  While reform advocates 
expected an inevitable emergence of economic “winners” and “losers” because 
of this “shock-treatment,” they only predicted this to be the case for the short-
term.  Reformers’ long-term expectations were that economic losers would 
eventually become winners due to opportunities present in an open market 
environment.   
Ultimately, economic reforms did deliver successful economic stabilization 
for many Latin American countries in the short-run.  Unfortunately, the long run 
benefits expected to make a difference in the poorer sectors of society did not 
trickle down as quickly as projected even though unemployment levels slowly 
dropped an average of one-half to three percent between 1990 and 200014.  In 
addition to the unemployment level, poverty levels throughout Central America 
slowly dropped but remained high during the same 10-year period: El Salvador 
39.6 percent; Guatemala 75; Honduras 65.9; Nicaragua 65.2; compared to the 
U.S.’ 8.6.15 
                                            
13  Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwege, "Import Substitution Industrialization" in Modern 
Political Economy and Latin America: Theory and Policy, eds. Jeffry Frieden, Manuel Pastor Jr. 
and Michael Tomz (Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), 159. 
14  International Labor Organization, "LABORSTA Internet: Yearly Data," International Labor 
Organization, http://laborsta.ilo.org/ (accessed December 11, 2006). 
10 
This unequal income distribution and the lack of basic social services 
therefore motivated individuals, in particular rural and poor urban youth, to seek 
out other venues in order to fill the vacuum.  Alfonso Gonzales, a Seymor 
Melman Fellow from the Institute for Policy Studies, argues a rise in both crime 
and youth gang activity begins to emerge out of this neo-liberal aftermath.16  
Compounding the situation with a post war environment where an overall weak 
judicial system is present sets the foundation for an atmosphere where crime is 
an easy solution.   
The western hemisphere has seen the growth of an atypical criminal entity 
flourish in the past two decades in the form of transnational criminal youth gangs.  
These transnational criminals have essentially redefined the way domestic law 
enforcement agencies track criminal gangs.  While at first considered by many in 
the law enforcement arena as common street gangs, these transnational gangs 
have grown to form a vast illicit network that extends from El Salvador, into 
Honduras and Guatemala, through Mexico and into the U.S.  While there are 
several transnational gangs in the region, this thesis will concentrate on the MS-
13 who has become the best known of the gangs due in part to their high use of  
 
 
                                            




0060111134320&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679 (accessed December 10, 
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violence while carrying out their operations.  Their criminal exploits have 
transcended international borders driving the gang to get national-level attention 
from both U.S. and Central American entities.   
3. Conclusion 
While transnational criminal groups in the western hemisphere may not 
share the same goal or ideologies terrorists possess, the latter may find the need 
to employ the criminal gang in order to accomplish an operation.  These 
transnational gangs, like the MS-13, contain characteristics that are attractive to 
terrorists.  Although current, irrefutable evidence is not available linking western 
hemisphere transnational gangs to Islamic terrorists, it would be irresponsible to 
believe such collaboration may not emerge in the future.  Events that took place 
in 2004 highlighted the reality of this issue.     
Intelligence reports surfaced that Adnan G. El Shukrijumah, a known al-
Qaeda lieutenant, allegedly met with MS-13 members in Honduras in July 
2004.17  Due to these reports, U.S. agencies such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are among 
the agencies that have recently started to work closely in monitoring 
transnational gang activity in the U.S. and the western hemisphere region.  
Meanwhile, Central American countries have also reacted in an effort to 
counteract the overwhelming criminal threat these gangs pose to country 
security.  This research aims at presenting how this event has spurred a need to 
monitor transnational gangs worldwide, and more specifically in the western 
hemisphere.   
D. RESEARCH DESIGN  
This thesis seeks to answer what the likelihood is Central American-based 
transnational criminal gangs will collaborate with Islamic terrorist organizations. 
Chapter II addresses the debate regarding cooperation between organized crime 
                                            
17Mike Ward, "Despite Denials, Rumors of Al-Qaeda Ties Linger," Austin American 
Statesman January 22, 2006, 
http://www.statesman.com/news/content/news/stories/world/01/22maraqaeda.html (accessed 
May 16, 2006); and  Jerry Seper, "Al-Qaeda Seeks Tie to Local Gangs," The Washington Times 
September 28, 2004, http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040928-123346-3928r.htm 
(accessed September 20, 2006). 
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and terrorist organizations. Scholars and analysts viewed any collaboration 
between these two groups as relatively low throughout the Cold War and prior to 
the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks.  Given the asymmetric 
characteristics of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), traditional perceptions 
about the issue are slowly changing.  The thesis argues certain organized crime 
characteristics are attractive to terrorist organizations operating in the current 
environment.  Consequently, Chapter II explains why terrorists may revert to 
crime and the different opportunities available to do so.  As globalization is taking 
a greater hold of the world every day, a discussion of how this phenomenon 
affects actors at different analytical levels follows.  Ultimately, the evidence 
presented will assist with the argument that while short-lived terrorist-criminal 
links facilitated by globalization are a high possibility, a long-term alliance is 
unlikely.  
After understanding the characteristics of criminal networks and the nature 
of what draw potential terrorists to these systems, Chapter III introduces the 
reader to the issue of western hemisphere transnational gangs. There are 
several transnational gangs present within the region; the two largest are the MS-
13 and 18th Street Gang (M-18).  Of the two, however, MS-13 has spread farther 
and influenced more individuals; therefore, MS-13 will be the thesis’ focus.  
Chapter III provides addresses MS-13 origin, gang structure, demographic 
composition, and current threats it poses to the region. 
Next, Chapter IV discusses the current public security problem engulfing 
Central America and MS-13’s role in this issue.  The chapter looks at potential 
factors that may have contributed to the rise in violent crime throughout the 
region.  Countries throughout Central America have taken measures to address 
this problem.  Countries in the northern portion of Central America have pursued 
a heavy-handed approach, placing heavy emphasis on law enforcement only.  
Meanwhile, those in the southern portion of the region have opted for a multi-
faceted strategy, incorporating prevention and rehabilitation programs in addition 
to law enforcement.  Then, my research contrasts these courses of action with 
the U.S.’ current anti-gang strategy.  Ultimately, the research will help explain 
13 
why a multi-faceted approach to the transnational gang problem will provide 
better long-term results than current heavy-handed legislation.  
Given the evidence presented in the previous chapters, the thesis 
concludes with an explanation of the plausibility of a western hemisphere and 
terrorist organization link.  Chapter V attempts to invalidate common 
misconceptions circling within the intelligence and academic communities by 
applying facts extrapolated from my research.  The thesis closes with policy 
recommendations for both the U.S. and Central American countries, addressing 
the need to support multi-faceted approaches to the transnational gang problem.  
By pursuing this course of action, the thesis argues the region may begin to undo 
the environment that currently facilitates transnational gang proliferation while 
concurrently reducing the risk of a transnational gang-terrorist link in the western 
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II. ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The subject of terrorism and organized crime is not new; however, 
scholars and analysts have seen it in a different light after 9/11.  Prior to the 
attack on the World Trade Center, scholars believed the likelihood of the two 
groups working together was low.  Given the asymmetric characteristics of the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), traditional perceptions about the issue are 
slowly changing.  Scholars and analysts have identified certain characteristics 
inherent to organized crime that are attractive to terrorist organizations seeking to 
operate in a post-Cold War environment.  Therefore, the different organizational 
structures of criminal groups first require attention.  Then, an explanation of why 
terrorists may turn to crime follows, highlighting different ways in which they 
employ criminal groups to fit their needs.  Next, I will discuss globalization, 
explaining how this on-going process facilitates both criminal and terrorist 
activity.  Ultimately, the evidence presented will support with the argument that 
while short-lived terrorist-criminal links are a high possibility, a long-term alliance, 
however, is not likely.      
B. ORGANIZED CRIME 
In his paper “Organized Crime and Terrorism,” Dr. Phil Williams from the 
University of Pittsburg identifies organized crime as organizations that are “… 
networked or hierarchical, which systematically adopt criminal activities in pursuit 
of profit as their ultimate objective.”18  Organized crime exists for the sole 
purpose of raising revenue in order to support a certain lifestyle – be it a lavish 
existence or a drug-induced standard of living.  These criminal enterprises, 
therefore, operate in a calculated and strategic manner. Consequently, decisions 
affecting an organization’s bottom line or risks that may bring undue scrutiny to 
their operations are quickly abandoned.  As Dr. Williams argues, profit is the 
ultimate objective.   
                                            
18  Phil Williams, Terrorism and Organized Crime, Defense Intelligence Agency Project on 
Terrorist Financing 2004-2005,[2005]), 2. 
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Organized crime exists in an anarchic void inadvertently aided by 
globalization and democratization.  Criminals have manipulated the legal 
networks uniting a globalized world.  To further their agendas, organized crime 
has exploited the various loopholes created by globalization.  In addition, criminal 
organizations have also flourished within new democratic states that have 
emerged throughout the region due to the democratization movement beginning 
in the 1970’s.  Many newly established democratic states began experiencing 
gaps between governmental agencies and political institutions as the recently 
attained democratic concept blossomed concurrently with a switch to an open 
market-based economic system.  Such environments, where a high propensity 
for corruption exists along with the incapacity to enforce laws, become promising 
for organized criminal entities to prosper.19   
There are several forms of organized crime available once lawbreakers 
have identified a suitable environment.  One form emerges when criminals 
become bound to a specific geographic area.  Criminals in this case seek to 
incorporate their illicit network into the local government.  These particular 
organizations may resort to intimidation and extortion with the intention of 
influencing state officials or institutions’ decisions.  In seeking out political 
affiliation, criminals ultimately want complete control over local commodities and 
natural resources.  As a result, a mutually beneficial relationship may develop 
between government representatives and criminals.  On one hand, criminals 
become “silent partners” within the political system; on the other, politicians 
subsidize their incomes with bribes provided by criminals.20   
A network aimed at the production and distribution of illicit goods is 
another kind of organized crime.  Unlike the previous form of organized crime, 
territorial ambition is absent.  Partnerships between rival entities in this form of  
 
                                            
19  Picarelli and Shelly, Organized Crime and Terrorism, 94-95 
20  Frank Bovenkerk and Bashir Abou Chakra, Terrorism and Organized Crime, Willem 
Pompe Institute for Criminal Sciences Paper, University of Utrecht, Netherlands (2005), 
http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/law/2006-0803-
203003/bovenkerk_05_terrorism_and_organized.doc (accessed December 10, 2006), 4, 5. 
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criminal enterprise, therefore, are not binding.  Nevertheless, individual groups 
may come together in either instance to cooperate and generate as much 
revenue as possible.21   
1. Major Characteristics 
a. Organizational Structures  
Organized criminals have no problem transcending physical and 
political boundaries that constrain governments and their respective law 
enforcement agencies.  These transnational organized crime groups have 
established networks that operate outside of globally recognized boundaries.  
Leadership and the organizational make-up help explain why a particular 
organization is poised for success or doomed to failure.  
Networks may emerge with a centralized leadership figure at its 
head.  This individual operates the network with “chiefly authority,” where 
command emanates from the power of coercion22.  As a “chief” manages through 
armed force and intimidation, social standing and aptitude are not necessary 
requirements for leadership.  A permanent fixture within the organization, the 
chief ultimately dictates courses of actions to network entities.  As power is 
achieved by force, however, chiefs may ultimately be “removed” in the same 
manner.  
Networks may also materialize with the resemblance to an 
acephalous organization; that is there is an absence of a centralized leader or 
representative dictating courses of actions.  In this type of organizational 
structure, a “big man” may emerge.23  This type of leader is often one who 
inspires others to follow or behave in a certain manner, lacking the direct power 
to compel individuals into action.  In many cases, the person with most prestige 
                                            
21  Bovenkerk and Chakra, Terrorism and Organized Crime, 5 
22 The term ‘chiefly authority’ is derived from notes taken in Dr. Anna Simons’ ‘Anthropology 
of Conflict’ class held at the Naval Postgraduate School.  For additional information see Anna 
Simons, "Backbone Vs. Box: The Choice between Principled and Prescriptive Leadership" in The 
Future of the Army Profession, eds. Lloyd J. Matthews, Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins 
(Boston: McGraw-Hill Primis Custom Publishing, 2002), 379-395.  
23 The term ‘big-man’ is derived from notes taken in Dr. Anna Simons’ ‘Anthropology of 
Conflict’ class held at the Naval Postgraduate School.  For additional information, see Ibid. 
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and experience emerges as the big man.  Decision making, therefore, does not 
lay with a single individual but rather is a process where all participants have a 
voice.  In the event a disagreement arises, actors in this process may choose 
from two paths: dissolving a previously established contract or removing a 
current big man from the position of influence via a majority decision.   
Criminal networks may be comprised of an individual group or a 
number of entities all sharing a “professional” relationship.  In one alternative, 
criminals may choose to operate independently of a larger network.  Many illicit 
organizations may first choose to begin in this manner before forming working 
relationships with rival groups.  A hierarchical structure presents itself as another 
alternative open to cartels seeking to work together.  A final option allows 
individual criminal entities to operate freely within an overarching network.  
(1)  Leaderless structure.  As described by the title, the 
absence of a defined leader marks this organizational configuration.  A big man 
personality rather than chief often emerges in the form of an inspirational leader.  
In this case, however, this type of group is not in contact with any other group nor 
does it have direct contact with the big man.  In essence, this inspirational 
individual only serves as the group’s muse.  Groups in this structure may identify 
with an overarching cause or objective but do not claim affiliation with a particular 
network.  Prior to its transnational status, for example, the Mara Salvatrucha 
gang began as a local street gang throughout Los Angeles’ Hispanic barrios in 
the early to mid 1980’s.  Not initially affiliated to an overarching crime 
organization, the gang existed only to protect the safety and illicit business affairs 
of its small number of members.  Members held in high regard, rather than 
coercive chiefs, served as the gang’s decision makers.24 
(2)  Hierarchical.  A single leader emerges as the sole 
decision maker in this type of organizational configuration.  This individual directs 
through chiefly authority: the leader obtains and preserves power through 
                                            
24  Chris Dishman, "The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge," Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 28, no. 3 (May/June 2005), 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=890132051&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=P
QD (accessed September 15, 2006), 243. 
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coercive means.  Leaders administer guidance from the top-down in this 
structure – at times becoming micromanagers.  The chief administrator, however, 
will often delegate organizational direction via high-ranking subordinates who 
embody the leader’s authority.  While communication may emerge from the lower 
echelons, leaders in a hierarchical organization will always have the final say.  
The Medellin, Colombia drug cartel serves as an example of the criminals within 
a hierarchical structure.  During the 1980’s, the Medellin cartel was led by a 
single individual – Pablo Escobar.  While retaining final veto power, Escobar 
delegated guidance via a small cadre of lieutenants.  The process continued until 
the lowest echelon within the cartel received the instruction.  Any sign of 
insubordination or incompetency, provided Escobar with enough justification to 
take corrective action. These are but a few of the ways in which Escobar 
embodied an individual with chiefly authority.25 
(3)  Decentralized.  Criminal organizations operating within a 
network often belong to this category.  Networks operating in this manner are 
truly acephalous on a grand scale.  While a decentralized system may not have a 
single leader, a “leadership node” may emerge within the network, essentially 
creating a resemblance to a hierarchical system.  As groups within this network 
system exercise little to no communication between each other, a leadership 
node may ultimately be comprised of individuals representing the interest of their 
respective association.  In this case, a network is “polycephalous” – leadership 
by many.  A big man, instead of a chief, may eventually appear out of this node.  
Rather than a “leader,” members of this node regard this personality as the first 
among equals. The responsibility falls on the leadership node, therefore, to 






                                            
25  Chris Dishman, "The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge," 241 
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network.  As such, in the event of dissention, members of decentralized networks 
have available to them the same options found within a smaller acephalous 
organization.26     
Many transnational criminal groups operate in a 
decentralized manner.  These networks often are nothing more than “business 
agreements” that can be cancelled or altered at any time – depending on the 
immediate and strategic needs of their operation.  As a result, disagreements 
may ultimately jeopardize business transactions when former allies become 
enemies.  Although members within decentralized networks exist in a volatile 
environment, this characteristic has proven difficult for governments to 
successfully and completely shutdown.  Government responses to transnational 
criminal organizations currently appear futile as they retain the traditional frame 
of mind regarding territorial boundaries.   
Given their transnational reach and their stateless existence, 
the removal of a particular criminal network leader or sector of operation does 
little to topple the entire criminal enterprise.  While short-run results may hurt the 
production or services a particular network provides, similar actors may emerge 
to fill in the void created by law enforcement operations.  Removing a criminal 
leader, therefore, will only allow for single or multiple criminal entitles to surface 
and assume control.  Once again, Colombia’s problem with drug cartels and its 
subsequent response during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s serves as an 
example.   
Pablo Escobar’s Medellin-based narco-trafficking network 
extended from the Andes region, through Mexico as well as the Caribbean and 
into the U.S. during the 1980’s.  After several years of evading authorities, 
Colombian authorities successfully killed the cartel leader in 1993.  Escobar’s 
death consequently created a leadership vacuum that allowed the rival Cali 
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Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "The Advent of Netwar: Analytic Background," Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism 22, no. 3 (July 1999), 
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cartel, among other smaller drug producers, to seize control of the former 
Medellin drug network.  Over time, however, the Cali cartel has lost most of it 
power to both smaller drug producers as well as to the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC).  Although U.S. and Colombian law enforcement 
have expended vast amount of resources to curtail the drug trade, its survivability 
exemplifies the difficulty governments have in dealing with transnational criminal 
organizations. 
b. Use of Violence 
Criminal organizations resort to violence within their own 
association or against external actors while attempting to expand or protect their 
criminal network.  Internally, the application of violence ensures control and order 
within the organizational ranks.  Externally, violence is specifically used to, “… 
promote organizational goals, eliminate competitors, and remove political 
threats.”27  In both instances, violence is a show of force – a validation of power. 
Accordingly, criminal violence strategically targets business 
competitors, internal challengers, and even state officials.  Once again looking at 
the Colombia example, Escobar reportedly killed numerous associates due to 
insubordination.  The cartel boss obtained control over his subordinates’ actions 
by instilling fear within their ranks.  This internal violence also fostered 
competition among subordinates who vied for Escobar’s endorsement.  The 
existence of this in-house violence consequently motivated subordinates to 
oversee business operations accurately.  
Criminal organizations employ violence in the same strategic 
manner.  Leadership within these illicit organizations may revert to intimidation 
tactics or assassination to protect or expand business.  In many cases 
assassinations are directed only against individuals wielding power, such as 
other criminal bosses or government officials, seeking to disrupt business.  In 
other cases, criminal organizations may use violence in order to control a 
                                            
27 Louise I Shelly and John T. Picarelli, “Methods Not Motives: Implications of the 
Convergence of International Organized Crime and Terrorism,” 308.  
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governmental office.  The strategic assassination of an honest official for 
example, may open the way for a more corruptible individual to assume office.   
Another form of violence is intimidation.  This tactic is versatile – 
criminal entities may employ it against high government officials as well as 
against personalities within the local community.  Criminals may choose to offer 
Individuals in positions of power or local business owners, for example, 
protection from rival organizations in exchange for a “fee.”  In many instances, 
however, this fee is not an option but rather a requirement.  Consequently, 
criminal organization will consider those who reject the “protection” as 
antagonistic and a potential hazard to business.   
While violence is commonplace within the criminal world, 
delinquents choose to use it strategically.  Power is the ultimate goal when 
employing violence.  When criminals ultimately achieve this power, business will 
flourish.  Therefore, the use of violence is ultimately a means to an end – 
decentralized organizations are able to regulate internal challengers, while 
concurrently intimidating or eliminating external threats.  
c. Secrecy 
Organized criminals do not want to draw undue attention to their 
actions.  Doing so may incite law enforcement investigations that will lead to a 
potential loss of revenue.  Consequently, criminals strategically carry out any 
decisions and subsequent actions.  This is especially crucial when employing 
violence against business rivals or state officials.  Criminals prefer to operate in 
society’s shadow – evading law enforcement attention. 
Having identified the characteristics that may attract terrorists, a 
discussion on the proposed reason why these organizations employ crime to 
raise fund or resolve logistical issues follows.  Terrorists can employ several 
methods of crime in order to fulfill their operational requirements.  The rest of the 
chapter, therefore, will tie in how terrorists manage criminal operations within the 
context of a globalized world.  In the end, this will allow for a discussion about the 
likelihood of short-lived organized crime-terrorist links in the chapter’s conclusion.  
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C. TERRORIST THAT REVERT TO CRIME 
Scholars often acknowledge that the level of state-funded terrorist 
operations significantly decreased with the end of the Cold War.  When the 
Soviet Union ceased to exist, the financial and materiel support to terrorist 
organization once provided by the Soviets and its allies disappeared.  Terrorist, 
therefore, sought different solutions to resolve the loss of operational support 
once offered by countries.  While some terrorist organizations relied on non-
government or private sponsorship to carry out their objectives, others groups 
turned to crime to satisfy the same needs.  Before looking at these alternate 
avenues of funding, however, an explanation of how the 1991 collapse of the 
Soviet Union affected state sponsored terrorism; Libyan and Lebanese-backed 
violence throughout Latin America serves as an example.    
1. Post Cold War Environment 
Middle Eastern state sponsors of terrorism were active in Latin America 
during the 1980’s and into the 1990’s.  Libya’s government, for example, was a 
close supporter of Nicaragua’s Sandinista regime, providing weapons and 
explosives to the government.  Aside from arms shipments, Libya also offered 
military training to several insurgent groups throughout the region, such as the 
now demobilized Colombian April 19th Movement.  Libya also attempted to recruit 
Latin American nationals in an attempt to target U.S. assets in the region.  While 
there were a number of disappointments, Libya found success with Peru’s 
Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA).  Throughout the late 1980’s, 
Libyan-backed MRTA operation led to the bombing of the U.S. ambassador’s 
residence and two U.S.-Peruvian bi-national centers.28 
As the international landscape shifted towards an environment willing to 
embrace democracy, governments rejected state-sponsored terrorism as a 
method to bring about radical change.  Governments disrespecting other states’ 
sovereignty often lead to a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of both constituents and 
the international arena.  The mere perception a state’s sovereignty is at risk, 
                                            
28  Mark S. Steinitz, "Middle East Terrorist Activity in Latin America," Policy Papers on the 
Americas 14, no. 7 (July 2003), 3-4. 
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therefore, may provide enough justification for world powers to use economic 
sanctions or apply military force against the offenders.  This change of global 
perception, nevertheless, did not completely shield Latin America from terrorist 
attacks orchestrated by external actors.   
Argentina, for example, experienced terrorist attacks in the 1990’s at the 
hands of Lebanon’s Hezbollah.  In 1992, a bomb exploded at the Israeli embassy 
in Buenos Aires by the Islamic Jihad Organization left 29 people dead and 245 
wounded.29  Two years later another bomb exploded at the Argentine-Israeli 
Mutual Association; the attack killed 86 and wounded hundreds.  Again, a 
Hezbollah-associated organization – Ansar Allah – claimed responsibility.30 
Most countries, nonetheless, changed courses of action, ceasing the 
support of terrorism.  Libya, for example, ceased supporting terrorism due to 
international scrutiny and the need to deal with the globalized world.  Libya’s 
measures ultimately led to its 2006 removal from the U.S. list of terrorist 
supporting countries.  Such evaporation of state funding in the end compelled 
terrorist to seek out new fundraising avenues to sustain operational costs. 
2. Alternate Avenues for Funding  
A number of courses of action became available to terrorists seeking 
financial and material support.  One option open to terrorists was relying on 
private non-government associated supporters to provide for their immediate 
needs.  Osama bin Laden serves as an example for this first group.  The wealthy 
bin Laden quickly became the financial backer, role model, and spiritual leader to 
many like-minded Islamic extremists during the 1980’s.  Along with Mohammed 
Atef, the wealthy bin Laden founded the al-Qaeda terrorist organization.  While 
al-Qaeda’s infrastructure collapsed due to the 2001 U.S.-led efforts in 
Afghanistan, bin Laden remains the charismatic leader for countless other  
 
                                            
29  Both the Islamic Jihad Organization and Ansar Allah are Hezbollah associate groups 
based in Lebanon.  Anti-Western views and efforts at establishing an Islamic republic in Lebanon 
comprise their objectives.  Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Background Information 
on Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State,[1999]), 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2801.htm (accessed February 22, 2007).  
30  Steinitz, Middle East Terrorist Activity in Latin America, 6 
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affiliated or splinter terrorist groups harboring like-minded anti-Western 
viewpoints, such as the Al Tawhid Iraqi insurgency group formerly directed by 
Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi.31  
While certain terrorists sought out independent sponsors, others found 
their logistical needs met by turning crime.  Terrorist reverting to crime as a 
source of funding inevitably assume inherent risks, such as law enforcement 
attention that lead to arrests and the possible exposure of true intent.  Ultimately, 
terrorists choosing to assume the risk accompanying this lifestyle may enter this 
criminal underworld with or without the assistance of an established illicit 
network.   
a. Entry-Level Crime  
Terrorist may opt to enter the criminal world without the use of an 
established system.  In this case, terrorists forgo organized criminal assistance 
and start a criminal scheme on their own.  This method calls for an “entry-level” 
approach, allowing terrorist to enter this underworld via sectors requiring little to 
no experience while concurrently reducing the possibility of exposure.  This 
method, therefore, allows groups to operate multiple low-risk operations.  Crimes 
such as credit card fraud, illegal sale of fraudulent phone cards, and cigarette 
smuggling present little risk, yet provide a highly profitable return.  Extortion has 
also emerged as a low-risk form of terrorist fundraising.  Middle Eastern business 
proprietors who own interests in a community where the presence of Islamic 
terrorist groups exists, for example, often fall victim to this crime.  As time 
passes, terrorists will slowly work on building expertise in a particular activity 
limited to a specific geographical area.  Regions with little or weak law 
enforcement control, therefore, become ideal for these groups to hone criminal 
skills with little threat of arrest.32 
Although representing a higher risk level than the ventures 
discussed above, criminal rings present another self-start venue.  South 
                                            
31 A U.S. air strike in Northern Iraq killed Al-Zarqawi in June 2006.  Answers.com, "Al 
Qaeda," Answer Notes, Answers Corporation, 2006, http://www.answers.com/topic/al-qaeda 
(accessed February 22, 2007).   
32  Picarelli and Shelly, Organized Crime and Terrorism, 94-95 
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America’s Tri-Border Area (TBA), for example, is host to operations like money 
laundering and counterfeiting rings.33  This region is home to a number of Middle 
Eastern owned businesses – some of which are sympathetic to both Hezbollah 
and Hamas, a Sunni Muslim Palestinian organization that is also present in the 
Western Hemisphere.  Some of these businesses are money exchange houses, 
often used to “clean” money generated through illegal means such as 
counterfeiting.  These rings will forge and reproduce anything from cash, clothes, 
and software, to official government documents.  It is possible terrorists, like 
criminals, ultimately use these objects either to transport illegal immigrants into 
the Western Hemisphere or sell them for cash.34 
Another lucrative and versatile fund raising operation identified in 
the TBA emerges from the worldwide proliferation of small arms.  Both the 
Lebanese mafia and Hezbollah associates engage in arms smuggling within the 
region.  In July 2002, for example, Paraguayan authorities uncovered an arms 
smuggling ring spearheaded by a Hezbollah associate.  Documents recovered in 
the operation revealed the authorization for the use of USD$30 Million in arms 
purchases.  In the end, the easy availability of light arms allows terrorists the 
option to either sell the weapons or barter them for items that can later be sold 
for cash.35   
Finally, although carrying the highest risk, the drug trade presents 
itself as arguably the most lucrative fund-raiser.  Due to the U.S.’ ongoing war on 
                                            
33 The geographic territories where Argentina’s, Brazil’s, and Paraguay’s borders merge form 
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drugs, law enforcement entities have scrutinized narcotrafficking activities to a 
point were the operation is on par with terrorism.  Colombian and U.S. authorities 
alike have restructured anti-narcotic policy in Latin America after 9/11 in order to 
obtain government funding for the war against drugs; ultimately developing the 
term “narco-terrorist.”  Since current U.S. drug policy targets the supply chain, 
authorities track intercepted shipments not only to their source of origin, but to its 
intended buyer as well. Terrorist organizations using the drug trade to finance 
operations are therefore at a higher risk of detection by law enforcement 
authorities. 
b. Existing Networks 
As described above, terrorists may venture into criminal activity in 
order to fund operation-related expenses.  Terrorists may also seek to venture 
into criminal activity purely out of logistical needs.  In these cases, terrorists 
might choose to employ existing criminal networks for services beyond their 
capabilities.  One possibility is the need to transport goods through the same 
proven smuggling routes drug cartels manage.  As such, the presence of such 
infrastructure eliminates terrorists’ necessity to create a similar system.     
Latin America is host to a variation of illegal logistical networks 
ranging from narcotics, arms, to human smuggling.  Mexico and Peru’s human 
smuggling rings serve as an example.  During the late 1990’s and early 2000’s 
these rings specialized in the transport of Middle Easterners.  Reportedly, these 
individuals initially arrived in Central or South America then traveled through 
Mexico and up into the U.S.36  Local authorities forced these rings to disband 
through several law enforcement operations undertaken between 2003 and 
2005.  The dismantling of these networks has forced both Middle Easterners and 
Arabs to seek similar networks, such as the network operated by the Mara 
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Southern Mexico.  This particular operation, therefore, may possibly attract 
potential terrorists that may have previously relied on the Mexican and Peruvian 
rings. 
D. GLOBALIZATION 
The phenomenon referred to as “globalization” has been for some time, 
and currently remains, a topic that generates passionate debates.  Globalization 
advocates believe it will ultimately produce a safer, more peaceful global society.  
Opponents, however, argue the process only promotes corporate abuse of the 
labor force in the name of higher profit returns.  Additionally, detractors fear the 
undermining of both democracy and security as globalization facilitates 
admittance to sectors previously not easily accessible to criminals and 
terrorists.37 
Scholars view globalization as a never-ending process as well as a by-
product of the information revolution.  In his book, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 
Thomas Friedman defines globalization in the following manner: 
Globalization involves the inexorable integration of markets, nation-
states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before – in a 
way that is enabling individuals, corporations, and nation-state to 
reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than 
ever before.38  
As Friedman suggests, globalization transcends territorial, socioeconomic, 
and political borders via a system of networks and relationships.  Furthermore, 
this process has the capacity to influence at various levels of analysis – regional, 
national, and individual and non-state actors.  Technology has also played a 
major role in the proliferation of globalization.  Advances have made trade more 
efficient – creation of more powerful engines, for example, have cut 
transportation time. Technology has also made communication simpler and more 
practical – cell phones are now affordable enough for mainstream use. 
                                            
37  Ellen L. Frost, "Globalization and National Security: A Strategic Agenda" in The Global 
Century: Globalization and National Security, eds. Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost 
(Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press), 35. 
38  Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar Strays Giroux, 
1999), 7-8. 
29 
Globalization, therefore, may ultimately become a long-term process that will not 
halt until all networks and actors are fully integrated.  In order to understand how 
globalization is a continual process towards integration, a discussion on how the 
process affects actors at the individual, regional, and national levels is required.39 
1. Individual Level and Non-state Actors 
At the individual level, technological advances have made communication 
products relatively affordable.  Consequently, more people have access to 
products that virtually eliminate distance.  Individuals can now communicate with 
someone cross-country or on the other side of the world by using computers.  
People on opposite ends of the globe interact without any prior meeting.  This 
facilitation of communication has allowed incidents, regardless of importance, to 
become world events inevitably influencing perceptions and societies.  
Globalization, as a result, has facilitated the proliferation and consequent 
integration of new cultures and ideologies to societies that may have never 
interacted otherwise.40   
Furthermore, globalization has facilitated operations for non-state actors 
such as private business corporations and non-government organizations 
(NGOs).  In the first example, the integration aspect of globalization has 
decreased operational costs for many corporations.  This rise in capital has 
allowed companies to extend beyond their respective home base and establish 
business ventures abroad.  Major corporations have accordingly attained a 
position of influence by recognizing the power of combining high earnings with 
international networks and professional relationships.  This rise in power, 
therefore, allows companies to voice approval or concern regarding policies 
potentially detrimental to their investments with greater influence.  41 
2. Regional Level 
As described above, integration is the main objective of globalization, 
particularly in a peaceful region such as the Western Hemisphere.  Coupled with 
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technological advances, the rise of democracy in the latter part of the 20th 
Century has created fertile ground for economic agreements to emerge within 
this particular region.  These agreements have permitted the removal of barriers 
that may have at one time or another allowed for the exclusion of small, newly 
formed markets.  Latin America’s relationship with the U.S. will serve as an 
example of the influence globalization has had over the region’s economic 
practices.  The adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
by the U.S., Canada, and Mexico provides a quick example.  
Since going into effect in 1994, NAFTA has increased economic relations 
between its three members: intra-NAFTA trade in 2000 represented 56.7 percent 
of its trade with the world; intra-NAFTA trade grew an average of 10.8 percent 
between 1990 and 2000, while the rest of the world only averaged 4.8 percent 
within the same period.42  However, aside from increased trade and the removal 
of trade barriers, NAFTA also addressed other social and political issues.  This 
NAFTA by-product has allowed both U.S.-Mexican and Mexican-Canadian 
relations to increase.   
3. National Level 
Globalization has encouraged governments to communicate on a variety 
of domestic issues from international institutions like the United Nations (U.N.) 
while retaining their sovereignty.  This has consequently allowed discussions 
ranging from poverty and human rights, to environmental protection to be 
address within an international forum.  Globalization, therefore, raises awareness 
within the develop nations regarding issues affecting lesser-developed countries 
while subsequently exposing these nascent states to greater global issues.  
Ultimately, this desire for global inclusion motivates countries to view networks 
and relationships, rather than natural resources, as sources of power.   
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Creating new or joining existing networks, hence, will make these nations more 
attractive to both other nations and independent economic actors.43   
4. Globalization’s Dark Side     
In accordance with the globalization critics, the process has facilitated the 
lowering of certain standards; security to a certain extent is victim to this process.  
Considering only the legitimate business and personal transactions taking place, 
globalization draws governments to operate with a false sense security.  As a 
result, criminals or terrorists once held at bay due to formerly imposed 
government limits now have access to the same networks used by legitimate 
consumers.  According to Dr. Moises Naim, editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy 
magazine, governments are currently facing five wars in the wake of 
globalization: drugs, arms trafficking, alien smuggling, money laundering, and 
intellectual property.44   
a. Drugs 
Dr. Naim argues drugs are considered the worst and most 
proliferated of all the five wars in his article, “The Five Wars of Globalization.”  
The U.S. spends approximately USD$40 billion each year in intelligence 
gathering and interdiction missions in the war against drugs.45  The current U.S. 
anti-drug strategy involves stopping drug shipments along U.S. borders, targeting 
international growers and producers, and ultimately pursuing domestic 
distributors.  Essentially, the U.S. is placing all its efforts on the supply side of the 
drug chain.  In following this logic, policy makers target suppliers with the 
intention of driving up the drug costs.  Even though costs have risen, the demand 
for drugs has not abated and thus producers continue to make a profit. 
This profit, therefore, has allowed narco-traffickers the capacity to 
lose an inexpensive refining stations] occasionally.  Furthermore, narco-
traffickers are continuously finding ways to circumvent these also thanks to their                                              
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illegal earnings.  As such, Dr. Naim explains drug-producers can afford to own a 
fleet of single-engine planes, fast-boats, and even order the construction of 
custom-built submarines.46   
The drug industry has become so lucrative and competitive 
countries like Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia have all been, or currently are, 
involved in the drug trade.  The highly profitable characteristic of the drug trade 
have consequently allowed international drug cartels to exploit the corruption 
found within countries, such as the ones previously mentioned, to further their 
income.  This transnational aspect has allowed borders to be a non-issue, 
increasing the difficulty of combating the drug problem.     
b. Arms Trafficking 
At almost 20 percent of all small arms trade, the illicit arms industry 
produces approximately one billion dollars a year.47  As often is the case, 
criminal organizations may engage in arms trafficking simply for profit.  Weapons 
traders indiscriminately sell their goods to the highest bidder, regardless of intent.  
In other cases, criminal organizations use arms as a form of payment in 
exchange for services rendered.  Members of the Central American transnational 
gang, Mara Salvatrucha, for example, reportedly engage in weapons trafficking 
throughout the region as a form of fund-raising.  Civil wars that ravaged El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras during the latter half of the 20th Century 
have enabled the access to small arms and explosives within the region. 
Arms trafficking in not limited to just small arms – tanks, aircrafts, 
as well as other weapon-related articles have all surfaced in the black market at 
one time or another.  What is more troubling is that within the last 10 years the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed the emergence of 
several cases of nuclear-weapons-usable material in black markets.  
Organizations like the IAEA believe the amount of this material to be small and, 
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therefore, too expensive for common criminals to purchase.  However, terrorist 
organizations with enough financial support may be able to afford such material – 
in which case price may no longer become an issue. 48  
c. Alien Smuggling 
According to the U.N., alien smuggling boasts a seven billion dollar 
market.49  Most of these illegal travelers pay thousands of dollars to be smuggled 
into a more prosperous country than their own.  Others place themselves at the 
disposal of the smuggling network and inevitably become indentured servants in 
order to pay off their debt.  Yet another group exists, often comprised of 
kidnapped women and children, forced into the black market as commodities.50   
Of immediate concern to U.S. national security is the smuggling of 
illegal aliens into U.S. territory.  Hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens, mostly 
from Mexico and other Latin American countries, enter the U.S. through Mexico 
in order to seek out a better life.  While the majority of these illegal immigrants do 
not carry anti-American beliefs, the possibility exists for illegal aliens harboring 
anti- U.S. ideologies to enter our country as well.  Consequently, the Department 
of Homeland Security reports authorities apprehended approximately 90,000 
illegal aliens from countries known to be involved with terrorism between 2001 
and 2005.51   
d. Money Laundering 
An undeniable by-product of globalization and economic 
liberalization, money laundering has been facilitated by the deregulation of 
markets and the introduction of new technology.  Few countries can claim to be 
free of this issue.  In fact, money laundering accounts for two to five percent of 
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the world’s annual gross national product.52  Thanks to the development of the 
internet, for example, cross border transfers can be done in seconds.  As such, 
illegal transactions are inevitable lost among the thousands of legal transactions 
made within the complex global financial network.  These technological 
innovations have accordingly transformed money from a tangible asset to 
numbers on a screen.   
e. Intellectual Property 
The same advances in technology that enables the world to 
communicate quicker and more easily have also aided the counterfeit/piracy 
boom.  The demand for globally recognized brands has also played a part, as 
people tend to migrate to brands that are well known.  China, for example, has 
previously made motions to buy U.S. companies for the potential profit a 
particular brand may bring. Governments have attempted to copyright property 
through various means, one of them being the World Trade Organization’s 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.53  In doing so, the piracy 
issue is brought to the forefront within forum that allows all countries, whether 
young and weak or large and powerful, to be on equal footing in establishing 
guidelines for regulation. 
Globalization has allowed countries to reach out and interact more easily 
than ever before.  Ultimately, globalization operates within a chaotic environment, 
as territory, geography, and time does not bind this process.  Technological 
advances have bestowed upon people the capacity to communicate with each 
other as well as their respective government with much greater ease.  These 
same technological advances have also enabled individuals to interact with 
communities throughout the world, free of the limitations set forth by physical, 
cultural, economic, or political boundaries.  While these are the positive attributes 
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to globalization, a more ominous side of this long-term process unfortunately 
exists as seen in the black markets described above. 
E. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Government officials, such as ex-Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Rand Beers, maintained in 
2002 a terrorist and organized crime link unavoidable, especially in a post-Cold 
War environment.  It is evident that differences between the two groups 
discourage any cooperation; however, the number of similarities shared 
overcomes any potential obstacles to mutual aid.  These similarities when 
combined with a besieged or failing governmental environment, supports Beers’ 
argument since this atmosphere serves as fertile grounds where criminals and 
terrorists may flourish. Consequently, the facilitating aspect of globalization only 
adds to the inevitability of an organized crime – terrorist link.54 
1. Motivation as a Separator 
While organized criminals and terrorist organizations seemingly share 
similar characteristics, certain equally important differences require attention.  
The biggest divider separating a terrorist from a criminal is motivation.  
Individuals may initially turn to crime in order to survive, to attain basic needs.  As 
the process of satisfying these needs becomes easier, however, these same 
individuals eventually may turn to crime as the answer to support a certain 
lifestyle.  Meanwhile, as indicated above, terrorists resort to crime in order to 
survive and carry out a particular mission within the boundaries of a sponsorless 
environment.  It is need, rather than desire, that encourages terrorists to enter 
the criminal underground. 
Motivation also plays a role in the level of violence a criminal or terrorist 
chooses to inflict.  Organized criminals tend not to use violence for the sake of 
violence.  In instances where criminals externally employ aggression, they use 
violence to protect business networks or tangible assets.  Internally, criminal 
bosses may use brutality in the event a subordinate threatens their position or as 
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a way to secure loyalty through force.  Criminals, therefore, will more often use 
violence strategically against a very specific individual or group.  Terrorists, on 
the other hand, aim at inflicting widespread panic and damage through terror.  A 
terrorist’s use of violence, therefore, is much different from a criminal in that 
terrorists seek to exact as much violence as possible.  Terrorist do not recognize 
“innocent bystanders”; as such, these organizations administer carnage 
indiscriminately over a particular population.  Whereas criminals organizations 
will attempt to avoid disrupting legitimate networks in fear possible repercussions 
to their own legitimate businesses, terrorist intentionally choose to exact violence 
on symbolic targets as well as existing officially recognized systems.  Al-Qaeda’s 
9/11 attack on the World Trade Center did just that: kill thousands of people, 
while simultaneously destroying a landmark symbolizing the heart of the world’s 
financial complex, thereby disrupting this network globally.   
Finally, ideology surfaces as another facet of motivation that further 
distinguishes the two groups.  Terrorists may eventually choose not to work with 
criminal entities based on ideological reasons.  While terrorists may involve 
themselves in minor criminal activities, or use existing networks for logistical 
purposes, their ultimate goal remains ideological.  These organizations, 
therefore, will attempt to avoid anything that will ultimately counter their beliefs.  
One example of such behavior is the reluctance of Islamic terrorists in using state 
corruption to their advantage.  These individuals hold an inherit rejection of using 
bribes as it goes against their principles.  To do so, essentially means the 
support the very system of state corruption the terrorists renounce.55  Unlike 
organized crime, terrorists ultimately hold crime only as a means to an end, not 
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agenda like terrorist do.  They are not seeking the overthrow or removal of a 
government, but rather the nurture of the same – it is through this corruption that 
their businesses flourish.  
2. Terrorist-Criminal Link through Similarities 
While motivation stands as the biggest difference between the two groups, 
the two share more similarities that suggest a terrorist-criminal link is possible.  
As Beers argues, these similarities arise from potential financial and logistical 
needs.  Criminals benefit from the military expertise and weapons access 
provided by terrorist organizations while terrorists benefit from an established 
criminal network and potential consumers for illicit commodities.56  As both 
operate within the context of an illicit underworld, both groups share a common 
enemy – government authorities.   
Criminals are constantly evading scrutiny from local and state authorities.  
When their business crosses boundaries, such as the case with the Medellin 
Cartel, the law enforcement response accordingly grows to include action from 
more than one country.  Likewise, terrorists also try to elude local and 
international counterterrorist scrutiny.  Threats consequently multiply when 
terrorist decide to use crime or interact with underworld personalities to resolve 
financial or logistical needs.  Secrecy as applied to organized crime is therefore 
as equally important to terrorists.      
One camp highlights the issue of secrecy as a point of divergence 
between terrorist organizations and organized crime.  Terrorists’ sole aim, this 
group upholds, is to communicate their agenda to the world by any means 
necessary.  The sheer nature of their existence is to spread their political 
message to as many places as possible, raising public awareness to whatever 
may be their cause.  Consequently, these actions may bring undue attention to 
criminal organizations that prefer to operate in secrecy.   
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Given the post-9/11 environment the world lives in, however, secrecy is 
just as important to the terrorist organization as it is for organized crime.  The 
attack on the World Trade Center could not have occurred without extensive 
planning leading up to the strike.  A breach of security may have led terrorist 
plans astray, and consequently halted efforts to raise the world’s awareness of 
their ideology.  As such, in order to ensure the worldwide propagation of their 
message, the 9/11 terrorists used discretion in the period leading up to their 
attack.  The risk of detection at the hands of law enforcement authorities, 
consequently, becomes a real threat – one that rises with the number of criminal 
enterprises terrorists operate. 
The organizational structures found within the criminal world emerge as 
another similarity that may facilitate a link between the factions.  Just as criminals 
operate in a hierarchical, decentralized or leaderless manner, so too do terrorist 
organizations.  Terrorist organizations such as the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army, for example, exemplify a hierarchical structure; however, more often than 
not, the majority of current terrorists operate in a decentralized or leaderless 
manner as exemplified by Islamic radical groups.  The March 11, 2004 Madrid 
bombings represent a good example of a leaderless terrorist organization.  
Spain experienced a devastating terrorist attack that day when a string of 
bomb blasts ripped through commuter trains.  One hundred-ninety one people 
died and thousands others wounded.  Within a day, terrorist groups linked to al-
Qaeda were claiming responsibility, threatening further action unless Spain 
withdrew from Iraq.  Others within the Spanish government believed the 
bombings to be the work of Basque Homeland Freedom (ETA) organization.  
Nonetheless, terrorist strategically launched the attack three days before Spain’s 
presidential elections.  Spain’s Socialist candidate, Jose Luis Rodriguez 
Zapatero, ultimately won the election.  One of his first acts as president was to 
redeploy 1,300 Spanish troops out of Iraq.57   
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Although many in the Spanish government believed ETA had a hand in 
the bombing, evidence revealed during the government’s investigation 
continually pointed to Islamic extremist.58  Ultimately, the investigation uncovered 
domestic fanatics actually planned, organized, and launched the attack.  While 
authorities did not discover any official connection or physical contact to al-
Qaeda itself, bin Laden reportedly became the spiritual leader and model for this 
leaderless group.59  This decentralized or leaderless structure, as seen with the 
Madrid train bombers, therefore brings all the nuances of the leaderless or 
decentralized structure in tow: an acephalous environment, the emergence of 
“big man” versus “chiefly” authority.  As a result, the eradication of such groups 
becomes complicated as the removal of one big man may spawn the 
materialization of one or multiple new leaders or offshoot organizations. 
Finally, the process of globalization also emerges not only as a point of 
congruence, but as a facilitator to the terrorist-criminal link as well.  As terrorist 
are more likely to operate in a decentralized manner similar to organized crime, 
each terrorist cell within this structure becomes responsible for fund raising to 
support their own immediate needs as well as the overall operation.  The five 
black markets, as described above, therefore become the ideal medium where 
terrorist and criminal needs may intersect. Due to globalization and advances in 
technology, evasion from law enforcement within the globalized has become 
much easier for criminals and terrorists alike.  When the exploitation of 
globalization is combined with a lawless environment found within the confines of 
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weak or failing state, the likelihood for a terrorist-organized crime link increases.  
Such was the case in India during the 1990’s when terrorist organizations 
employed the use of organized criminals. 
In the afternoon of March 12, 1993, 10 bombs exploded throughout the 
Indian capital of Bombay.  The bombs killed 257 people and injured over 700 
others throughout India’s economic center.  Reportedly, the deaths of Muslims at 
the hands of Hindu fundamentalists rioting in 1992 sparked the attacks.60   
Through recovered evidence, Indian authorities linked Dawood Ibrahim, 
the head of an Indian criminal organization, to the attack.  Prior to the strike, 
authorities knew Ibrahim managed a criminal network famous for extortion, 
prostitution, contract killing, and drug trafficking. Reportedly, the Inter-Services 
Intelligence of Pakistan approached the crime boss with the concept of launching 
an attack against several of India’s important economic institutions.  With the 
help of Dawood’s financial backing, Indian nationals reportedly trained in 
Pakistan to carry out the bombings.  Upon the successful execution of the attack, 
Dawood once again financially facilitated the bombers’ escape to Karachi, 
Pakistan.  The crime boss himself fled India to Karachi when authorities linked 
Dawood with the attack. Consequently, Dawood soon became one of India’s top 
10 most wanted criminals.61        
Subsequent U.S.-aided Indian government investigations into the D 
Company have reportedly revealed links to the Islamic radical group Lashkar-e-
Tayyiba as well as al-Qaeda; the latter reportedly used Dawood’s criminal 
smuggling routes in exchange for monetary compensation.  Consequently, the 
U.S. officially designated Dawood as a terrorist supporter in October 2003 based  
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on these findings.  Dawood remains at large and suspected of residing in 
Pakistan, which continually denies his presence and has consequently rejected 
all requests for extradition.62   
Given the evidence presented, a strategic link between terrorist and 
organized criminals is more likely than a long-term partnership.  Terrorists and 
criminals alike are most likely to cooperate in areas where the other has a 
comparative advantage.  A marriage of convenience therefore ensues where 
agreements are not binding but rather momentary – be it a one-time event or 
lasting as long as both individuals who initiated the agreement honor their pact. 
Scholars such as Tamara Makarenko and Chris Dishman argue there will 
be a rise in the number of “hybrid” organizations throughout the world.  These 
scholars identify hybrids as organizations that initially began as strictly terrorists 
or criminal.  As each group began progressively employing the other’s tactics, 
their actions slowly began to resemble a combination.  Hybrids, therefore, 
maintain characteristics of both criminal and terrorist organization while not solely 
being identified as either.63 
While scholars, such as Tamara Makarenko and Chris Dishman, believe 
hybrid organizations may eventually be the norm, it is highly unlikely radical 
Islamic terrorists will eventually convert into full-fledged organized criminals.  The 
religious devotion at the core of radical Islamic terrorists’ ideology would 
ultimately prevent this from taking place.  In the end, crime is just another tool in 
the terrorist’s arsenal.   
Ultimately, organized crime and terrorist organizations share more points 
of similarity than they do differences.  While motivations and ideologies may 
differ, both revel in their decentralized organizational structure.  This 
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arrangement affords both criminal and terrorist alike the ability to operate in an 
acephalous manner.  Additionally, both groups take full advantage of 
globalization in order to meet certain objectives.  The eventual reliance organized 
criminals and terrorist organizations may have on each other becomes inevitable 
as both groups cross paths in the usage of similar networks.  Although each 
group enters into such relationships with an amount of reservation, both benefit 
from the level of anonymity globalization offers.  Nonetheless, while organized 
crime-terrorist links are possible, these relationships will most likely resemble 






























III. MARA SALVATRUCHA BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Children of Central America's bloody wars immigrated to the U.S., 
where they became violent gang members, then deported back to 
Central America to begin another generation. 
National Public Radio’s Mandalit del Barco, 200564 
A common misconception holds that the western hemisphere’s transitional 
gangs are a product of Central America.  Ironically, two of the largest 
transnational gangs, the MS-13 and the M-18, actually have their origins in the 
U.S.  While the public and law enforcement agencies know these gangs for their 
extremely violent behavior, MS-13 has spread farther and influenced more 
individuals thereby gaining greater notoriety of the two.  MS-13, therefore, will be 
the focus of this chapter; a brief explanation of their origins will start the 
discussion.  A discussion on the MS-13’s organizational structure and 
demographic make-up follows.  Finally, the chapter will close with a narrative of 
the current threats MS-13 presents to the region. 
B. CIVIL WARS: MARA SALVATRUCHA ORIGINS 
The Salvadoran Civil War, fought from 1980 to 1992, forced more than 
one million people, mostly peasants and farmers, to seek refuge among its 
regional neighbors and the U.S.65  Refugees arriving in the U.S. initially settled in 
the predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods in Southern California and 
Washington DC.  As refugees moved in, they quickly became targets of other 
Hispanic gangs, like the already established M-18, that did not accept the 
Salvadorans.  The result was the creation of MS-13 – a group where Salvadoran 
youth could band together for protection against other gangs.   
                                            
64  Mandalit Del Barco, "International Reach of the Mara Salvatrucha," National Public Radio, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4539688, March 17, 2005 (accessed May 
16, 2006). 
65  Al Valdez, A South American Import (Los Angeles: Orange County District Attorney's 
Office, [2000]), http://www.nagia.org/Gang%20Articles/Mara%20Salvatrucha.htm (accessed May 
16, 2006). 
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It is possible the western hemisphere transnational gangs like the MS-13 
are the embodiment of civil war’s legacy.  Many original MS-13 members 
reportedly were prior Salvadoran Civil War veterans.  Accordingly, gang 
members reportedly refer to the original founders as “veteranos” – Spanish for 
veterans.  Recent literature regarding the MS-13 topic only alludes to the 
possibility of a Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and MS-13 
connection.66  Elisabeth Jean Wood’s book, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil 
War in El Salvador, however, supports the likelihood of this relationship.67 
During the 1979-1992 Salvadoran Civil War, Wood explains humble farm 
workers, known as “campesinos,” chose to support the FMLN movement against 
the Salvadoran government.  This led to a symbiotic relationship where 
campesinos received protection from the Salvadoran military as well as self-





                                            
66 Formed in 1980, the FMLN upheld the interests of the five major Salvadoran leftist groups: 
the Central American Workers’ Revolutionary Party, the People’s Revolutionary Army, the 
Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces, the Armed Forces of National Resistance, and the 
Communist Party of the Armed Forces of Liberation.  As the leading opposition organization to 
the then-Salvadoran government, they denounced the series of military juntas that had been 
illegally controlling the country since the 1930’s and sought to replace it with a Communist 
government.  Their efforts lead to an armed conflict against the Salvadoran government, 
highlighted by offensives throughout the 1980’s that ended with peace negotiations in the early 
1990’s. For additional information see MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, "Group Profile: 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front," Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 
http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=228 (accessed March 14, 2007).. 
67 Wood, a Professor of Politics at New York University, interviewed over 200 individuals 
between 1987 and 1996.  The author sought interviews throughout all the class and political 
levels of the El Salvador.  She conducted interviews with the landed elites, clergy from local 
parishes, former FMLN commanders, high-ranking Salvadoran military officers, non-
governmental organizations’ staff members, and with Salvadoran government officials.  Wood 
also interviewed external actors such as representatives from both the U.S. Agency of 
International Development and the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador.  However, 
the author reserved the bulk of her interviews for the campesinos themselves.  For more 
information, see Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 19, 20. 
45 
intelligence support.68  When the civil war violence escalated to a level 
intolerable for many campesinos, however, numerous Salvadorans fled to 
neighboring countries or the U.S.69 
As many as 64,500 Salvadorans immigrated to the U.S. between 1981 
and 1987; 6,829 immigrated to California in 1988 alone.70  Upon becoming 
targets of other Hispanics, young Salvadoran men began to band together in 
order to protect themselves and their small community.  Those men who had 
previously received paramilitary training reportedly formed the core of this new 
group, now known as Mara Salvatrucha.71  Previous research has not 
determined whether gang members reserve term “veterano” for the original 
founders, most of who may have experienced civil war violence, or simply a sign 
of respect to senior members.  Wood, however, seems to reinforce the former 
concept, and the subsequent theory that FMLN influence may have 
                                            
68  Valdez, A South American Import; and Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in 
El Salvador, 10-12. 
69  A July 2000 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-backed (UNHCR) Working 
Paper cites World Refugees Surveys taken by the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
in 1981 and 1985 which indicate a rise from approximately 87,000 to 251,700 refugees, 
respectively.  The surveys included entries from Honduras, Nicaragua, Belize, Panama, Mexico, 
and the U.S.  For more information see Sarah Gammage and Jorge Fernandez, Conflict, 
Displacement and Reintegration: Household Survey Evidence from El Salvador (Washington 
D.C.: International Center for Research on Women [2000]), 
http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3ae6a0cb0.pdf (accessed March 13, 2007). 
70  US Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, US Bureau of the 
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1990. the National Data Book, 110th ed. 
(Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1990). 
71 Julio Cesar, Carlos Alberto Vasquez, and Ernesto ‘Smokey’ Miranda are reportedly 
several MS-13 founding members.  These and other founding members were exposed to civil war 
violence in a variety of ways.  Miranda, for example, received weapons training as a teenager.  
Like him, other founding members received paramilitary training before fleeing to the U.S., and 
used the knowledge later in the MS-13.  For more information, see Claire Marshall, "Combating 
El Salvador's Gangs," BBC News, March 20, 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3553529.stm (accessed December 16, 2005), and 
Mandalit Del Barco, "International Reach of the Mara Salvatrucha," National Public Radio, March 
17, 2005, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4539688 (accessed May 16, 
2006), and 6 ABC Action News, "MS-13: An Action News Special Report," American 
Broadcasting Company, WPVI-TV/DV Philadelphia Affiliate, May 22, 2006, 
http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=special_coverage&id=4195376 (accessed March 14, 
2007).. 
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unintentionally played a role in the later formation of MS-13.72  The training and 
discipline derived from the close relationship between the campesinos and the 
insurgents may have assisted during the initial structuring and organization of the 
MS-13, allowing it to grow into the present-day threat. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
MS-13 presents a good example of a decentralized and acephalous 
criminal organization, as previously discussed in Chapter II, operating in the 
Western Hemisphere.  The gang does not seem to have a central authority 
orchestrating the organization as a whole.  Instead, MS-13 organizes itself 
regionally, such as by state or province, city, or local community.  Within each of 
these regional factions, the gang is further broken down into small “clicas” or 
cliques that resemble individual operating cells.73  If the term “veterano” is of any 
indication, each clica is lead via big man-style leadership rather than by chiefly 
authority.   
FBI reporting from 2005, however, indicated the possible occurrence of 
multi-clica meetings in Los Angeles where an entry-fee is required to attend.  
Coordination in future endeavors, discussion of new anti-gang law enforcement 
efforts, and sanctions against individuals who have violated the gang’s trust are 
all actions that purportedly take place at these meeting.  If these reports are 
accurate, then these actions may indicate a rise in gang sophistication and 
organization.  Nevertheless, as is the nature of a decentralized and acephalous  
 
                                            
72  Wood points to three main motivators that drove campesino support for the FMLN: 
participation, defiance, and “pleasure of agency.” The act of participation within the insurgency 
movement provided the campesinos with empowerment, allowing them to feel as if they were 
actively changing their own destiny.  Even through non-combatant support, such as in the 
provision of food and intelligence, campesinos felt a sense of accomplishment.  This leads into 
the second motivator, defiance.  In providing non-combatant support or ultimately becoming an 
insurgents themselves, campesinos expressed moral outrage against a repressive government.  
Wood’s third motivator, the “pleasure of agency,” refers to the emergence of self-identity among 
the campesinos.  They accomplished this through their participation in the movement against the 
Government of El Salvador.  These three motivators encouraged the campesinos to support the 
FMLN despite the high risk to their communities, ultimately becoming an essential element of the 
insurgent movement’s survivability.  For more information see Wood, Insurgent Collective Action 
and Civil War in El Salvador, 231-237 
73  U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, "Mara Salvatrucha: MS-13," Refugees.org, 
www.refugees.org/uploadedFiles/Investigate/ms-13.pdf (accessed May 16, 2006). 
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organization, competition for clica leadership as well as control over particular 
sectors of the networks is never ending.  Consequently, inter-mara violence 
continues throughout the region.74 
D. DEMOGRAPHICS  
The FBI, the National Drug Intelligence Center, and regional law 
enforcement agencies estimate Central America has over 62,000 members from 
different gangs.  These members generally range between 11 and 40 years of 
age.  Although numbers differ between countries, the overwhelming majority of 
active gang members are under 24 years of age.  Consequently, 8-18 year old 
boys make up the group most at risk of assimilation into gang life.  Children in 
this age group are the first to feel the brunt of living within a marginalized society.  
Often times they have limited to no access to educational or extra-curricular 
opportunities.  This lack of initial investment in human capital spills over into the 
work force, as legitimate job opportunities are scarce for the uneducated.75 
More often than not, organizationally sponsored or community based 
activities, such as sports or musical programs, are not readily available to this 
sector of society.  This results in youth gravitating towards the gang lifestyle 
rather than seeking out constructive endeavors.  The propensity for at-risk youth 
to join a gang climbs when the individual is a product of a broken or abusive 
home or already has friends or family members active in gangs.  Carlos Vasquez 
a founding MS-13 member agrees, "The Maras offer a code, a family to 
members, many of whom come from broken homes or the streets."76  Gangs 
                                            
74  Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, House International Relations Committee, 
Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division Federal Bureau of Investigation before the 
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere House of International Relations Committee, 2005, 
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/swecker042005.htm (accessed May 16, 2006). 
75 Valdez, A South American Import; and USAID Bureau for Latin American and Caribbean 
Affairs Office of Regional Sustainable Development, Central America and Mexico Gang 
Assessment, 15 
76  Jeremy McDermott, "Youths Flock to Massive El Salvadoran Gang that is their Only 
Chance of a 'Job'," The Scotsman, sec. International, April 13, 2004, 
http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=416482004&format=print (accessed May 
12, 2006).  
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therefore are very receptive to these situations and offer potential recruits a 
sense of family, access to money, women, and unlimited power.77   
A MS-13 increase in membership led to a rise in the level of criminal 
activity perpetrated within the U.S.  Local and national law enforcement efforts 
correspondingly increased to counter the growing MS-13 related delinquency in 
the U.S.; successful arrests of members and clica leadership composed much of 
the initial results.  Once incarcerated, however, U.S. prisons became “finishing 
schools” for gang members.  MS-13 members learned criminal skills, later used 
to establish their illegal networks throughout the region, while in prison.78  When 
the signing of the Chapultapec Accords occurred in 1992, the U.S. subsequently 
began deporting many imprisoned gang members back to their home of origin.79  
Ultimately, the high volume of hardened criminals extradited to El Salvador only 
further overwhelmed a nascent government already engrossed with restoring 
order for returning refugees. 
E. CURRENT THREAT 
1. El Salvador 
Since 1992, El Salvador’s National Council on Public Security estimates 
gang membership has grown to approximately 39,000, of which about 22,000 
belong to MS-13.80  Salvadoran citizens find themselves caught in the middle of 
                                            
77  U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, Mara Salvatrucha: MS-13 
78  Sam Logan, Ben Bain and Kate Kairies, "Deportation Feeds a Cycle of Violence in 
Central America," World Press, March 31, 2006, http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/2304.cfm 
(accessed March 19, 2007). 
79 Signed on January 16, 1992 in Chapultapec, Mexico, the accords were the culmination of 
an open dialogue between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN.  While the Salvadoran 
government received the bulk of responsibility to construct the accords, it received assistance 
and guidance from USAID, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, the United 
Nations Development Program, the United Nations Children’s Fund, and the UNHCR. This 
process looked to address armed forces restructuring, creation of durable democratic institutions 
as well as socioeconomic development and stabilization.  Embassy of El Salvador, "The Peace 
Accords," The Embassy of El Salvador, 
http://www.elsalvador.org/home.nsf/0/2fd6010e5830065b85256b12006fcf51?OpenDocument 
(accessed February 20, 2007); and James L. Roush, "The El Salvador Accords: A Model for 
Peace Keeping Actions," The Foundation for Peace: Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution, 
http://www.promotingpeace.org/1985/1/roush.html (accessed March 3, 2007). 
80  USAID Bureau for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs Office of Regional Sustainable 
Development, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment: Annex 1: El Salvador Profile 
(Washington D.C.: United States Agency for International Development,[2006]), 45 
49 
inter-gang turf wars not much different from the war zones of the 1980’s, as 
gangs resort to instilling fear into the community.  Machetes and small arms are 
the gang’s preferred tools of trade.  Equipped with these, members commit 
murder, muggings, and sexual assault among other more petty crimes within 
their communities.   
According to FBI reports, approximately 10 murders occurred daily 
throughout 2006; gang members were allegedly responsible for about 70 
percent.81  MS-13 is among the caliber of criminals described in Chapter II that 
extort small business and public transportation for the right to operate in their 
respective neighborhoods.  El Salvador loses USD$1.7 billion, or 11.5 percent of 
its gross domestic product, to this and similar types of criminal activity against the 
economic sector.82  According to the 2005 World Bank report El Salvador 
Investment Climate Assessment, “… gangs are responsible of 27 percent of the 
crimes committed against the surveyed Salvadoran firms.”83  In addition, gangs 
are also responsible for crimes committed against 46 percent of micro-firms and 
37 percent of small firms within the survey.84  Ultimately, gang members carry 
out these types of activities with a high level of violence and little regard for 
human life.   
2. Honduras 
The scenario in Honduras is not much different from El Salvador.  Citizens 
in this neighboring country also live with the daily barrage of gang activity.  A 
recent U.S. State Department report indicated the presence of approximately 30-
40,000 gang members throughout Honduras; of these about 36,000 belong to                                             
81  Art Marroquin, "City News Service," City News Service, February 7, 2007, http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/document?_m=ed0faf34ff7790722e503190ea5c9641&_docnum=2&wchp=d
GLbVzb-zSkVA&_md5=73d8d7a7d63f0e465fbf86981cd1bbda (accessed March 2, 2007). 
82  United Nations Development Program, Cuanto Cuesta La Violencia? (El Salvador: United 
Nations Development Program,[2005]), 
http://www.violenciaelsalvador.org.sv/images/stories/documentos/cuanto_cuesta_la_violencia_a_
el_salvador/cuaderno_mayo2005.pdf. 
83 The survey consisted of in-person interviews of 465 firms of all sizes and economic 
sectors throughout the entire country.  World Bank, El Salvador Investment Climate Assessment 
(El Salvador: World Bank,[2005]), http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/07/28/000012009_20050
728091539/Rendered/PDF/327111SV0rev.pdf (accessed March 4, 2007), 16, 28. 
84  Ibid, 28 
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MS-13.85  Although gang activity was present in Honduras during the late 1980’s, 
members were often involved in petty crime and occasional turf wars.  This 
changed in 1995, a year of high criminal deportations from the U.S.86  Soon after 
this massive arrival, smaller unorganized gangs began to assimilate into the MS-
13. As gangs grew both in numbers and in influence, members began to branch 
out and operate in conjunction with MS-13 members in El Salvador and later 
Guatemala.  Criminal acts against the country’s economic sector are similar to El 
Salvador’s for both micro and small firms; however, gangs are responsible for 28 
percent of crimes against large firms.87  Facilitated by both porous borders and 
overwhelmed police forces, MS-13 eventually extended their criminal network to 
span from Honduras, through Southern Mexico, and into the U.S. 
3. Southern Mexico 
Originally, membership in MS-13 was exclusively Salvadorans.  As the 
gang established and expanded its networks, however, membership opened up 
to Hondurans, Guatemalans and even a small number of non-Hispanic African 
Americans. This expansion subsequently mirrored MS-13’s need to work with 
larger, established organizations such as the Mexican Mafia.   Upon receiving 
recognition form the Mexican Mafia, MS-13 added the number “13” to their name 
as a tribute to the larger group.88  
MS-13 members’ inclusion within Mexico’s criminal network was 
subsequent to the U.S. deportation practices in the early 1990’s.  As gang 
members attempted to reenter the U.S. illegally, those that were unsuccessful 
settled along the Guatemalan/Mexico border. Consequently, approximately 3,000 
                                            
85  Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices -- 2005: Honduras (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State,[2006]), 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61732.htm (accessed January 15, 2006); and Shelly 
Feuer Domash, "America's most Dangerous Gang," Police: The Law Enforcement Magazine, 
March, 2005, http://www.policemag.com/t_cipick.cfm?rank=90876 (accessed March 2, 2007). 
86  USAID Bureau for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs Office of Regional Sustainable 
Development, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment: Annex 3: Honduras Profile 
(Washington D.C.: United States Agency for International Development,[2006]), 92. 
87  World Bank, El Salvador Investment Climate Assessment, 28   
88  Valdez, A South American Import,  
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MS-13 members are located along Mexico’s southern border.89  MS-13’s 
presence along the Guatemalan/Mexican has placed the gang in a position to 
operate key criminal networks throughout the region.  
From the southern Mexican state of Chiapas MS-13, members control 
considerable portions of networks specializing in the smuggling of people, drugs, 
weapons and vehicles.90  MS-13 smugglers use a cargo railroad to transport 
their illicit goods into northern Mexico.  Currently, MS-13 members “own” the 
eastern Mexican train route that runs from Chiapas to Tabasco, through Veracruz 
and into northern Mexico; 90 percent of these are freight trains.91  Additionally, 
cartels may hire clicas to serve as security details between destinations.  In the 
wake of the dismantling of the Mexican and Peruvian alien-smuggling rings 
mentioned in Chapter II, MS-13 has emerged as a primary purveyor for human 
smuggling within the Central American/Southern Mexico region.  Through 
violence and intimidation, MS-13 has gained control over a majority of the 
railways through Mexico.  As such, prospective illegal aliens – to include potential 
terrorists – would likely have to use this particular smuggling network in order to 
reach the U.S. 
4. United States 
The National Drug Intelligence Center estimated MS-13 membership 
within the U.S. at more than 8,000 members throughout 31 states, including the 
District of Columbia, in the early part of 2005.92  Furthermore, at a hearing before 
the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere House International Relations 
Committee, Assistant Director for the Criminal Investigative Division of the FBI, 
Chris Swecker, testified MS-13 is not only operating within highly urbanized 
communities but also, “…in places as disparate and widespread as Oregon City, 
                                            
89  USAID Bureau for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs Office of Regional Sustainable 
Development, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, 17 
90  Cruz, Al-Qaeda's Unlikely Allies in Central America, 1 
91  Davidson, Terrorism and Human Smuggling Rings in South and Central America, 3 
92  Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division Federal Bureau of 
Investigation before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere House of International 
Relations Committee 
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Oregon, and Omaha, Nebraska.”93  Apparently confirming this fear is a 
November 2006 Customs and Border Patrol Journal, which provides a more 
recent account of MS-13 membership in the U.S.: it states gang membership is 
now 10,000 spread across 33 states.94  Chapter IV will look more closely at how 
the U.S. government and both local and federal law enforcement agencies have 
responded to the transnational gang threat.   
F. CONCLUSION 
Many scholars claim MS-13 and similar western hemisphere transnational 
gangs are the legacy left behind by the bloody Salvadoran Civil War.  
Unfortunately, the same skill-sets used to launch an insurgency – often taught to 
Salvadoran peasants for self-defense – MS-13 founders employed to fight a 
different war.  What began as a united front for young Salvadoran men against 
other Hispanic gangs on the streets of Los Angeles grew to become a broad and 
powerful entity – one that not only overcame rival gangs, but also overwhelmed 
governments.  The combat techniques, organization, and discipline instilled by 
the FMLN during its early formations allowed the MS-13 to remain a formidable 
force when deported members returned to El Salvador.  Gang members used 
this training, combined with the “street smarts” accumulated while gangbanging 
in the U.S., to exploit weaknesses within the new Salvadoran government and its 
nascent democracy.  MS-13 took full advantage of an environment described in 
Chapter II, where little or weak law enforcement allowed them to hone their 
criminal skills with little threat of arrest.95   
Once establishing a foothold within the region, MS-13 became attractive to 
the marginalized youth.  MS-13 became the foster family for homeless young 
men, youth from broken or abusive homes, individuals who had little or no 
education and thereby unemployable – all seeking a way to survive.                                              
93  Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division Federal Bureau of 
Investigation before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere House of International 
Relations Committee 
94  Linda Kane, "CBP Confronts U.S.'s 'Most Dangerous Gang'," U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection Today 4, no. 10/11 (2006), 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2006/october_november/dangerous_gang.xml (accessed 
March 1, 2007) 
95  Picarelli and Shelly, Organized Crime and Terrorism, 94-95 
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Membership came with the price of violence, however; something often 
overlooked and embraced by existing and potential members alike.  This 
indiscriminate use of violence has forced citizens in the region to relive the terror 
so many attempted to avoid during the civil war years.  Likewise, the high level of 
gang activity has affected the regions economy to a point where international 
investors are leaving the area while potential firms are thinking twice before 
investing.   
Transnational gangs like MS-13 have successfully established criminal 
networks throughout the region that in one form or another come into contact 
with each of the five black markets covered in Chapter II.  Moreover, the success 
of their illegal doings and their violent tendencies has earned the MS-13 the right 
to work with existing entities, such as the Mexican Mafia, with little threat from 
rival actors.  The rapid rate at which the MS-13 and similar transnational gangs 
have spread throughout the northern Central American area has prompted 
regional governments into action.   
Chapter IV, therefore, addresses the different courses of action Central 
American governments have taken in response to the transnational gang 
problem.  Strategies on addressing the gang issue divide the region.  Certain 
countries have chosen to pursue a heavy-handed approach, where authorities 
place emphasis solely on law enforcement aspects.  Other countries, however, 
have adopted a multifaceted method, where law enforcement is only part of a 
bigger solution.  Ultimately, a better understanding of the potential factors 
causing this rise of violent crime within the region is required in order to address 
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IV. CURRENT RESPONSES TO TRANSNATIONAL GANGS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Lack of public security in Central America has emerged as the biggest 
threat to state legitimacy in the region.  Of particular consequence to this threat is 
the growth of transnational gangs.  Countries throughout Central America have 
taken measures to address this problem.  However, there are as many different 
approaches to the transnational gang problem as there are countries.  How have 
countries chosen to counter this crisis?  In order to answer this question, the 
thesis will first deal with what factors may cause the rise in violent crime 
throughout the region.  Next, the research will look at El Salvador and Honduras 
as case studies for the use of heavy-handed approaches to the problem.  
Following, I will look at alternative methods to resolving the gang issue as 
exemplified by Nicaragua and Panama.  As we live in a world where globalization 
is bringing different societies together, the discussion will turn to how heavy-
handed and multi-faceted approaches serve to influence other countries with 
similar problems; Guatemala, a country still undecided on an official anti-gang 
course of action, will serve as a case study for such countries.  Finally, after this 
regional outlook is complete, the paper will address how the U.S. has chosen to 
respond to the transnational gang issue and how its strategies may become a 
model for regional action.  The reader may take away a better understanding as 
to why certain countries may have chosen one particular course of action over 
another.  In the end, the research will also help to explain why a multi-faceted 
approach to this issue will fare better than one solely focusing on law 
enforcement efforts.   
B. WHO OR WHAT IS TO BLAME 
It is easy to blame the U.S. and its deportation practices for the growth of 
gang activity in Central America.  As was previously addressed in Chapter III, the 
1992 Chapultapec Accords allowed many Central American civil war refugees to 
leave the U.S. and return to their countries of origin.  Consequently, the U.S. 
deported hundreds of imprisoned gang members back to their home countries, 
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no questions asked.  This soon became a problem for authorities in countries like 
El Salvador where criminals cannot be lawfully detained for crimes committed 
abroad.  Central American countries, therefore, released these individuals upon 
their return.  This legal loophole consequently allowed violent and street-smart 
gang members to live freely in countries governed by war-weakened 
administrations more preoccupied with post-war reconstruction.  Gang members 
inevitably took advantage of the political and social conditions to launch their illicit 
operations and establish criminal networks resembling modern U.S. gang 
structures.   
While U.S.’ deportation practices are the most evident reason for the 
growth of gang activity in Central America, it is but one of many.  There are those 
who point to social inequality pre-dating gang member deportations as the 
primary rationale for the rise in both petty crime and violent gang activity.  
Alfonso Gonzales, a Seymor Melman Fellow from the Institute for Policy Studies 
argues that severe social and economic disparity as a result of neo-liberal market 
reforms are the cause of not only a general rise in crime throughout the Central 
American region, but more specifically, the escalation of gang activity.96   
1. Economic Liberalization    
As neo-liberal reforms appear to be the leading reason for the 
overwhelming rise in crime throughout Central America, a look into the region’s 
historical economic events is first required.  Import substitution industrialization 
(ISI) became the leading economic development strategy immediately following 
World War II, lasting into the 1970’s.  ISI perpetuated development throughout 
the region at the cost of the rural sector.  This allowed for the emergence of 
unequal levels of protectionist measures that favored the urban sector of society.  
As industrial growth flourished in the cities, agricultural growth dropped in the 
countryside due to the increasing taxation on exports. When primary exports 
failed to raise adequate levels of revenue, subsidies to the industrial sector hurt 
                                            
96  Gonzales, Rethinking U.S. Involvement in Central America's War on Gangs: The Case of 
El Salvador, 11 
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the government budget.97  By the early 1970’s, countries still implementing ISI 
measures were characterized by economies unable to compete internationally.   
As a result, Latin America slowly shifted from the state-controlled system of ISI, 
to a more open market structure.   
With this economic liberalization process, most Latin American countries 
began launching neo-liberal market reforms in the 1990’s. This economic 
restructuring called for austere measures aimed at ultimately preparing these 
financial systems to enter the international economic arena.  While reform 
advocates expected an inevitable emergence of economic “winners” and “losers” 
because of this “shock-treatment,” they only predicted this to be the case for the 
short-term.  Reformers’ long-term expectations were that economic losers would 
eventually become winners due to opportunities present in an open market 
environment.  Ultimately, economic reforms did deliver successful economic 
stabilization for many Latin American countries in the short-run.  Unfortunately, 
the long run benefits expected to make a difference in the poorer sectors of 
society did not trickle down as quickly as projected even though unemployment 
levels slowly dropped an average of one-half to three percent between 1990 and 
2000.98 
In addition to the unemployment level, poverty levels throughout Central 
America slowly dropped but remained high during the same 10-year period. 
(Table I)  The rural and poor urban sectors were the most affected: a majority of 
the public programs cut had benefited this specific societal segment.  
Furthermore, many previously state-owned enterprises were privatized forcing 
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Table 1.   Central American National Poverty Levels (%).99  
 
Year 1991 2000 
El Salvador 64.4 39.6 
Guatemala N/A 75 (2004) 
Honduras 74.8 65.9 (1999) 
Nicaragua 69.7 (1993) 65.2 (1998) 
Comparison 
United States 10.7 (1990) 8.6 
 
This unequal income distribution and the lack of basic social services 
provided motivation for rural and poor urban youth to seek other venues in order 
to survive in the reform-created vacuum.  Gonzales argues a rise in both crime 
and youth gang activity emerges out of this neo-liberal aftermath.100  Echoing his 
argument is Wilmer Antonio Salmeron, a gang member imprisoned in El 
Salvador on drug charges who explains, “I ran away from home, and [the gang] 
gave me money, a place to sleep. Maybe it was the wrong step I took, but I had  
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no options."101  Compounding this situation with a post war environment where 
an overall weak judicial system exists sets the foundation for an atmosphere 
where crime is an easy solution.  
2. Violence and Overwhelmed Police Forces 
Since no official databases exist that tracks crime and violence throughout 
the region, scholars and international non-government organizations (INGO’s) 
revert to the number of reported homicides as a rough indicator.  In a special 
report found in the January 2006 issue of The Economist, the number of 
homicides in 2004 is alarming.  There were 46 per 100,000 people murdered in 
Honduras; El Salvador followed with 41; Guatemala had 35.  In comparison, the 
U.S. had 5.7 for that same year.102  As Rolando Gamez, a resident of Escuintla – 
a town 28 miles southwest of the capital, Guatemala City – maintains, "This is a 
war and the gang members are winning.”103  One must keep in mind, however, 
these numbers only indicate reported murders.  While it is highly certain 
countless other murders take place and are not reported, the actual number of 
these is unknown.   
Unidentified murders, as well as victims of violent crimes, go unreported 
for a number of reasons.  For one, victims of violent crimes or family members of 
homicide victims do not come forward for fear of their own safety.  Often times, 
violent gang members perpetuate these crimes, threatening victims and their 
families with bodily harm in the event authorities are involved. 
A second reason lies in the public distrust in police forces often found 
within the countries of Central America.  This may be a holdover from the historic                                             
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relationship between police forces and citizenry in this region.  Police and military 
forces in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, for example, historically 
operated with little regard for human rights.  Another reason lies in the lack of 
both training and funding police forces receive that subsequently creates an 
overwhelming backlog.  As a result, cases go cold and leads are lost.  All the 
while, the average citizen loses faith in a state institution perceived as ineffective 
and indifferent to public security.   
Finally, this lack of trust in the police also affects the public’s perception of 
government competence.  The police force is the first line of defense against 
violent criminals and often times serves as the only manifestation of state 
presence; this institution becomes a de facto litmus test in assessing the 
citizenry’s perception of government legitimacy.  Armed with this perception of 
inefficiency, citizens begin to question the capacity of their government.   
This negative view, in turn, increases the potential reservation citizens 
may have with a process that does not seem to guarantee their security.  A 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded public 
opinion survey supports this point, indicating that victims of crime have less 
confidence in democratic institutions.104  As a product of poverty and social 
inequality, these violent criminal activities pose a threat to regional security and 
democratic process.105  Militaries of governments besieged by transnational 
gangs may consequently perceive their civilian leadership weak and ineffective 
when dealing with gang violence.  In much the same way military-led coups 
occurred to prevent the spread of Communism following the Cuban Revolution, 
militaries within these governments may attempt similar reactions aimed at 
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reestablishing public security through martial law.106  Even though citizens 
sacrificed large amounts of freedoms, people recall the low incidence of crime.  
Therefore, as the USAID survey suggests, and historical precedents imply, 
citizens may be sympathetic in the event an authoritarian-like government were 
to emerge because of rising crime levels.   
C. HEAVY HANDED RESPONSES: EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS 
A total of 1,751 people were killed in the first half of [2005]… the 
equivalent of nine people a day… 59 percent of the murders were 
carried out by the maras, often in inter-gang turf wars. 
Caribbean & Central America Report, 2005107 
Since 2003, both the Salvadoran and Honduran governments began to 
institute legislation aimed at curtailing the growing transnational gang problem.  
The two countries have officially adopted a heavy-handed approach as the 
means to responding to their current gang situation.  At the core of the legislation 
is the strong emphasis on law enforcement as the primary response to gangs. El 
Salvador’s “Mano Dura” legislation, inaugurated in 2003 by the Francisco Flores 
Administration called for zero-tolerance of gang activity and the use of heavy-
handed tactics to punish criminal behavior.  Its follow-on, Antonio Saca’s 2004 
“Super Mano Dura” offered the same, while increasing the National Police’s 
power in making arrests.  However, the legislation remains subjective in regards 
to what constitutes a gang member.  This leeway provides the Salvadoran police 
with the authority to question and ultimately arrest young men without due 
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process of the law.  Young men need only to give the perception of gang activity: 
appearance and social background set the foundation for profiling.  As a result, 
the National Police made approximately 11,000 arrests within one year of Super 
Mano Dura’s enactment.108 
The Honduran government followed El Salvador’s lead and passed similar 
anti-gang legislation in 2003.  Then-President Ricardo Maduro won the election 
on an anti-mara platform.  As such, his Ley Anti-Mara mirrored much of what El 
Salvador already had put into practice with the original Mano Dura: a strong 
emphasis on law enforcement while possessing a subjective interpretation of 
gang involvement that consequently led to indiscriminate arrests.   
Both countries’ anti-gang legislation also stipulated changes in the legal 
process of accused gang members.  El Salvador’s Super Mano Dura demands 
gang members found guilty serve a maximum of five years while gang 
leadership, nine.  Furthermore, the Salvadoran law declared children 12 years of 
age eligible for trial in adult courts.  In Honduras, anti-gang legislation stiffened 
the maximum prison sentence for adults involved in gang activity from 12 to 30 
years in December 2004.109   
1. Citizenry Reception  
The Salvadoran and Honduran public initially welcomed the 
implementation of these anti-gang laws with open arms.  Rafael Guardado, a 
mechanic living in Ilopango, six miles east of San Salvador said, “Before [Mano 
Dura], taxis wouldn't even drive here. It was too dangerous. But now you don't 
even see the gangs.”110  In their eyes, their government was finally taking action  
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against the violent crime produced by the transnational gangs – Guardado 
continues, “It's working, and they should tighten it even more. Bring in the army 
to patrol too."  
A 2004 Salvadoran Interior Ministry-backed public poll indicated over 70 
percent of those questioned believe Super Mano Dura was successful.  A 14 
percent drop in murders and the overall crime in 2004 translated to an approval 
rating of eighty percent for President Saca that same year.  In Honduras, a 60 
percent decline in gang violence increased the public’s support for these 
draconian laws.  Given these results, both the Salvadoran and Honduran public 
willingly welcomed what they perceived as the only way to regain security and 
order to streets and neighborhoods.111 
2. Critiques 
Two years later, however, all this changed – the same radical anti-mara 
laws aimed at ensuring security are now being held responsible for doing just the 
opposite.  According to the San Salvador Institute of Legal Medicine (Instituto de 
Medicina Legal de San Salvador), murders between January and May 2006 
increased seven and half percent compared to the same timeframe in 2005.112  
This data seems to echo a CID-Gallup opinion poll also conducted in El Salvador 
this past June: 65 percent of participants felt crime rose in the past two years; 61 
percent believed El Salvador’s current anti-mara legislation has not been 
effective.113  
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These latest results have only served to support local human rights groups 
and international organizations, such as the U.N., in their call for the overhaul of 
current anti-gang legislation. In a letter to President Saca, Amnesty International 
pressed Saca’s administration to abolish Super Mano Dura, highlighting the 
unconstitutionality of the legislation.114  Furthermore, the U.N. Committee on the 
Rights of a Child also condemned the legislation arguing Super Mano Dura 
violates the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.115   
Honduras has experienced similar public backlash to its Ley Anti-mara.  A 
combined U.N. and National Autonomous University of Honduras violence and 
crime-tracking project indicated, “…710 murders were reported in the first quarter 
[of 2006], 100 more than in the same period in 2005.”116  Human rights 
advocates have also lobbied against hard-line anti-gang legislation in Honduras.  
Maria Luisa Borjas, a former Honduran police commissioner, criticized the 
countries’ tactics saying police target, “…the poorest barrios without arrest 
warrants… grab the first three young people they find and present them as 
suspects.”117  Reina Rivera, President of the Center for Research and Promotion 
of Human Rights, a Honduran non-profit organization also supports this 
argument, “The government's political stance is based on a strictly short- term, 
repressive law-enforcement approach. Here in Honduras, it is a crime to wear a 
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tattoo or to dress in a certain manner.”118  Crime throughout northern Central 
America has been endemic for so long as a result of transnational gangs, civil 
rights organizations fear the unjust arrests of innocent citizens are taking place. 
a. Central American Prison Systems 
The current state of regional penal systems emerges as another 
point of contention for civil liberties organizations.  Regionally speaking, prison 
overpopulation presents the most serious threat to prisoner welfare.  According 
to a 2006 U.S. Department of State Country report, in 2005 El Salvador, “…there 
were 12,176 prisoners held in 21 correctional facilities and two secure hospital 
wards with a combined designed capacity for 7,372 persons.”119  Consequently, 
the sheer number of prisoners in these facilities has made rehabilitation 
programs near impossible.   
This overpopulation allows for the open use of drugs, alcohol, and 
weapons – all of which corrupt prison guards often facilitated.120  The low 
availability of proper medical care is another by-product of the high prisoner 
population.  In facilities throughout the region, prisoners infected with 
tuberculosis and other highly infectious diseases mix with the general population; 
in others, psychiatric care is not readily available.   
Ultimately, the combination of all these conditions provides a 
festering ground for violence that leads to the segregation of rival gangs housed 
within the same facility in order to reduce the incidences of violence and murders 
behind bars.  "The violence of the gangs never ends, not even when you lock 
them up," claims Maria Ophelia Ortiz Quinteros, whose nephew died during a 
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2004 inter-gang riot at a Honduran prison.  Quinteros’ account emphasizes the 
fact that incarceration does not prevent transnational gangs from continuing to 
operate their criminal network.  In fact, gang leaders find it safer to conduct 
business from behind prison bars than out on the street.  Assistant Director of 
Investigations in El Salvador, Douglas Omar Garcia Fumes, agrees, "They 
continue to operate even after they're arrested. Orders to kill are coming out of 
our prisons.”121  In an effort to curb gang activity by jailing criminals, these hard-
line gang laws have inadvertently converted the prison system into a criminal 
graduate school. 
b. Vigilante Organizations 
Of equal concern to international civil rights organizations is the 
alleged emergence of vigilante groups throughout the region. One of the better-
known death squads presumed to be in existence is the El Salvador-based 
“Sombra Negra.”122  This group supposedly enlists the participation of rogue 
cops and military members to target gang members via extrajudicial justice.  
Members of these vigilante groups comb neighborhood streets after hours in 
search of potential targets.  In a report issued by the human rights organization 
Casa Alianza states vigilante groups were allegedly responsible for, “…2,879 
children and young adults under the age of 23…” killed between 1998 and 
October 2005 in Honduras.123   
Central American countries have vehemently rejected the existence 
of such vigilante groups, officially rejecting their operations.  In 2003, for 
example, Honduras’ then-Security Minister Oscar Alvarez denied government 
approval of vigilante groups, "…first of all, it is a not a policy of the state and, 
secondly, we have made it very clear to the police that if they do it, they will be 
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prosecuted to the full extent of the law.”124  Consequently, the countries have 
expended resources in order to disavow these organizations.  Further quelling 
allegations of secret state-sponsored death squads purposely created to target 
gang members, the Honduran government launched an investigation that same 
year.  After two years of investigating, however, efforts only yielded arrests of 
eight former Honduran National Police officers.125     
D. ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES: NICARAGUA AND PANAMA 
Regional neighbors, such as Nicaragua and Panama have also taken 
measures to deal with gang activity.  However, unlike El Salvador and Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Panama have opted to pursue a different route in suppressing 
gang activity and criminal behavior in general.  Rather than enacting anti-gang 
legislation that places heavy emphasis on law enforcement, Nicaragua and 
Panama have elected to invest in programs that also include bigger emphasis on 
prevention and intervention efforts.   
Nicaragua shares a border with Honduras to the north; across the Gulf of 
Fonseca on its Pacific coast lays El Salvador.  Although proximate to countries 
that are home to the transnational gangs like the MS-13, there is little to no mara 
presence in the country.  This is extremely odd, especially since Nicaragua fits 
most of the requirements needed for the propagation of transnational gangs: 
post-conflict reconstruction, high level of inequality in income distribution, and 
little or no access to proper education.  This is not to say there are no gangs in 
Nicaragua – there are.  The difference is the majority of these gangs do not 
affiliate with any transnational gang.  Because of this, these gangs operate 
differently than MS-13.   
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These gangs resemble the “neighborhood” or “barrio” gangs found in the 
U.S. during the 1940’s and 1950’s.  Most of these gangs existed to represent 
their local neighborhood, and usually organized to defend its honor.  Initially 
these gangs participated in petty crime.  With the onset of drugs, however, these 
gangs became more involved with narcotrafficking beginning in the early 
2000’s.126  The mentality to generate personal profit through any means 
necessary consequently replaced the need to maintain honor.    
Although there was an increase from 110 to 184 gangs between 1999 and 
2004, gang membership has been on a decline.  In 2005, the National Police 
reported the existence of 108 gangs in the country.  Unlike El Salvador and 
Honduras’ homicide levels, the Nicaraguan National Police reports indicate a rate 
of eight homicides per 100,000.  The question remains, nevertheless, as to why 
transnational gangs have not established a foothold in Nicaragua.127 
Globalization may provide one possible answer to this question.  Through 
this on-going process, reports have been flooding out of El Salvador and 
Honduras as to the actions taken by their National Police. As MS-13 and other 
transnational gangs have surely made advances to build a network within 
Nicaragua, it is plausible local gangs in fear of governmental punishment similar 
to that of El Salvador or Honduras’ may have rejected any further foothold.  
Hence, in an attempt to protect their own criminal monopoly within the country 
and to concurrently repel unwanted law enforcement attention, Nicaraguan 
gangs may have purposely refused associating with violent transnational gangs. 
Scholars propose another theory that incorporates a former Sandinista 
program.  In the late 1970’s, early 1980’s the Sandinistas stood-up a social 
network known as the Sandinista Defense Committee.  They created this 
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network in order to provide the public a form of local government.  Although 
these committees were initially tasked with the food distribution and 
neighborhood improvement responsibilities aimed at deterring general crime and 
criminal violence, this extensive “neighborhood watch” program that covered the 
entire country soon became a tool to monitor the public’s whereabouts.  Coupled 
with this program, the country launched an officer-training program intended to 
professionalize the police force.  Both Panama and Cuba assisted Nicaragua in 
this professional development endeavor.  Their efforts were a success: 1,600 
communities collaborated with 1,500 police officers to combat and reduce crime.  
While this network is no longer as powerful as it was in the 1980’s, an echo of the 
original system remains within the Nicaraguan memory.  Researchers believe 
this network became Nicaragua’s first line of defense to ward off the MS-13 
threat.128 
Like Nicaragua, Panama also boasts a low homicide rate – two per 
100,000.129  The country’s gang situation is similar to Nicaragua’s in that they 
exist to preserve neighborhood honor and have not shown any level of 
organization along the lines of transnational gangs.  According to the Department 
of State, most of what occurs in Panama is petty crime such as armed robbery 
and muggings. Panamanian government reports indicate, “…juvenile 
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adults.”130  While there is a presence of youth gangs in Panama, they are not at 
the core of the majority of crimes committed.   
1. Legislation 
Nicaragua and Panama initially opted for heavy-handed approaches, 
similar to El Salvador’s Super Mano Dura, to resolve the issue of crime and gang 
activity.  During the late 1990’s, Nicaragua’s government realized the heavy-
handed anti-gang tactics employed were not producing successful result.  This 
development led Nicaragua’s National Police to redirect their strategy toward 
more preventative measures.  For Panama, attempts at a heavy-handed 
approach were more recent: in July 2004, then-President Mireya Moscoso 
pushed legislation that mirrored El Salvador and Honduras’ laws.  By September 
2004, however, newly elected President, Martin Torrijos, reversed Moscoso’s 
concept and introduced Plan Mano Amiga.131 
Torrijos’ answer to countering criminal and gang activity is a program with 
social rehabilitation at its core.  This U.N. Children’s Fund-backed plan provides 
educational and social opportunities aimed at developing and preparing 
Panama’s youth for the future.  The government geared Mano Amiga for the at-
risk youth found in the poorest sections of Panama’s two major cities: Colon and 
Panama City.  These programs introduce themes such as teamwork, self-
appreciation, and personal drive through team sports, culture, and community 
involvement.  The program’s ultimate goal is to provide alternatives to crime and 
gang life for an ambitious 10,000 14-17 year olds.132 
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Nicaragua has been able to take the same approach, thanks to the 
absence of transnational gangs within its borders as previously mentioned.  Its 
social program tries to capture at-risk youth’s attention well before they begin a 
life of crime.  In addition to the successful civilian-police interaction found 
throughout Nicaragua, representatives of government-funded social 
organizations ensure they have an overt presence within the marginalized urban 
neighborhoods.  There, these organizations through their representatives 
become a fixture of the local community, often providing athletic and cultural 
outlets for youth to develop.  Still other organizations make available basic 
educational courses and tutoring services to prepare them with fundamental 
employment skills.133 
Nicaragua continues reaching out to youth through its program even after 
they have gone the way of crime.  Unlike El Salvador and Honduras, police 
encourage gang members to open dialogue without the fear of arrest.  Through 
this contact, police and social workers attempt to convince gang members to live 
a life without crime.  For those already incarcerated, Nicaragua’s penal system 
also extends rehabilitation opportunities to its prisoners.  Unlike its counterparts 
in Honduras and El Salvador, Nicaragua’s correctional system provides a 
rehabilitation program open to all prisoners willing to take part.  The rehabilitation 
programs resemble those beyond prison walls: educational, cultural, and 
counseling sessions are available.  Furthermore, minimum wage jobs offered 
while in jail present prisoners with an opportunity to reintegrate into society.  
Given the on-going success of the current rehabilitation programs, the 
Nicaraguan government is not considering any further anti-gang laws.134  
E. THE SEEMINGLY UNDECIDED: GUATEMALA 
Although Guatemala has also suffered from the arrival of transnational 
gangs, the country is somewhere in between the heavy-handed and soft-
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approach responses.  Much like El Salvador and Honduras, the Guatemalan 
government opted to launch a heavy-handed strategy early on.  Similar to Super 
Mano Dura and Ley Anti-Mara, police arrest individuals based on the perception 
of gang involvement – subsequently overwhelming its already unresponsive and 
corrupt judicial system.     
Guatemalan President Oscar Berger won the 2003 presidential election on 
a strict anti-crime platform aimed at reducing transnational gang operations.  
Shortly after entering office in 2004, Berger began to lobby for the development 
of strict anti-mara legislation.  Berger followed up his efforts by signing into the 
Central American Integration System (SICA) security agreement in April 2005.  
This regional agreement formalized cooperation among the Central American 
countries, opening the way for better intelligence and information sharing as well 
as better collaboration between National Police forces and criminal justice 
authorities.135   
Even though this is the case, Berger’s administration has refused to 
formalize the current domestic anti-mara strategy into official legislation.  Since 
his 2004 inauguration, Berger has slowly emerged as a supporter of the soft 
approach strategy.  This is perhaps due to the fact Berger is only the second 
democratically elected Guatemalan president since the end of the 36 year long 
internal conflict in 1996.136  In a war in which hundreds of thousands people died 
at the hands of state-sponsored agencies, the issue of human rights violations 
remains fresh to this day.   
Consequently, Berger has sought middle ground in his efforts of bolstering 
domestic security while at the same time protecting his constituents’ civil liberties.  
It is evident Berger has taken notice of the criticism both El Salvador and 
Honduras have drawn from civil liberty rights organization as a result of their anti-
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mara legislation.  The level of criticism against the Berger administration’s use of 
strong-arm tactics against transnational gangs is relatively low – when compared 
to its two southern neighbors; this is most likely a result of the government’s 
unwillingness to establish formal anti-mara legislation.137  Therefore, the level of 
international criticism in combination with reports indicating the failure of heavy-
handed tactics reinforces President Berger’s resolve to reject current petitions for 
similar legislation and seriously consider the implementation of a multi-faceted 
resolution to the mara problem. 
F. U.S.: CURRENT RESPONSE      
The emergence of transnational gangs has gained the attention of officials 
at all levels of the U.S. government.  From the national to tactical levels the U.S. 
has proposed legislation and set in motion programs to counter the rising 
national and regional threat posed by transnational gangs.  At an April 2005 
hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere House of 
International Relations Committee, members of U.S. law enforcement agencies, 
USAID, and non-government organizations provided testimonies regarding the 
on-going issue of gang violence.  These agencies described their participation 
and introduced measures regarding both law enforcement and deterrence efforts 
against gangs in Central America.  
At the legislative level, Republican Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana 
introduced the North American Cooperative Security Act, S.853.  Presented on 
April 20, 2005, the legislation underwent review by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee.  The purpose of the bill was to increase cooperation among U.S., 
Canadian, and Mexican officials in order to create enhanced security 
administrative procedures.  The bill would have established a Central American 
gang-tracking database, in addition to better working relations aimed at 
increasing intelligence sharing between member nations.  S.853 arrived at the 
heels of H.R.1279 or the Gang Deterrence and Community Protection Act of 
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2005, which called for increased punishment for individuals who were involved in 
gang activity.  The House of Representatives passed H.R.1279 on May 5, 2005, 
and consequently passed the bill for Senate review.  As the 109th Session of 
Congress closed in January 2007, however, the Senate never voted on either 
S.853 or H.R. 1279.  Consequently, neither bill ever became law.  Nevertheless, 
the transnational gang issue remains a hot topic thereby increasing the likelihood 
lawmakers may introduce similar legislation in the future.138   
As for law enforcement efforts, the FBI is including MS-13 among its 
National Gang Strategy Priority Groups.  This has allowed the FBI to take active 
measures in countering MS-13 violence.  One such effort highlighted by the 
Assistant Director for the Criminal Investigative Division of the FBI, Chris 
Swecker, was the formation of a National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC).  This 
center serves as the central node in coordinating, analyzing, and disseminating 
all collected counter-gang intelligence among local, state, and federal actors 
throughout the country.139  In serving as an information enabler between different 
governmental agencies, NGIC ensures full involvement at all levels.  Mr. 
Swecker also announced during his testimony the creation of an organization 
subordinate to the NGIC, the FBI’s MS-13 National Gang Task Force (MS-13 
NGTF). 
Founded in December 2004, the MS-13 NGTF aims to disrupt the MS-13 
within the U.S. before the gang becomes better organized.  The MS-13 NGTF’s 
objectives are similar to that of the NGIC; however, they focus more on the 
dissemination of information about, identification of, and the multi-jurisdictional 
operations against MS-13 activity. MS-13 NGTF’s core participants currently  
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include the Drug Enforcement Agency; Bureau of Prisons; Customs and Border 
Protection; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; and the Department of 
State.140   
Several operations have served to highlight the success of interagency 
cooperation in halting MS-13 illicit activity.  The first successful example of 
coordination efforts took place in February 2005.  During this operation, Federal 
and Texas State law enforcement agencies collaborated to successfully arrest a 
MS-13 personality responsible for the December 2004 Honduras bus massacre 
that killed 28 people.141  Another example was a nationwide U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement-led effort to apprehend and deport illegal aliens living 
in the U.S.  Between February and March 2005, authorities successfully arrested 
103 transnational gang members in New York, Los Angeles, Washington, 
Baltimore, Miami, and New Jersey.  Perhaps the biggest testament to the 
success of these approaches, however, took place in September 2005.  Over 
6,400 government agents from the U.S., El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and 
Mexico collaborated via a joint command post located at the FBI Washington 
headquarters.  The two-day joint international operation yielded 660 MS-13 gang 
member arrests.142  
More recent government action has also taken place to further address 
the gang problem.  In early 2007, the International Chiefs of Police Summit on 
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Transnational Gangs took place in Los Angeles.  During the February 7-9 
summit, more than 100 U.S. Federal and local law enforcement agents convened 
with counterparts from Belize, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Mexico.  Consequences emerging from veteran gang members’ practice of illegal 
U.S. entry and consequent deportation to further gang operation provided the 
primary theme for the three-day summit.143 
At the summit, J. Stephen Tidwell, assistant director of the FBI Los 
Angeles Field Office acknowledged, “Los Angeles is ground zero for modern 
gang activity.”144  Further supporting his position is a January city-funded report 
indicating the presence of approximately 40,000 gang members within the Los 
Angeles City.145  Consequently, Los Angeles officials took actions reminiscent of 
those announced by Chris Swecker at the April 2005 Subcommittee hearing.  
Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa and Police Chief William J. Bratton 
announced on February 8 plan to address the gang problem within the 
Californian city.  The strategy calls for the establishment of a unit specifically 
designed to investigate gang-related homicides.  The mayor and police chief 
anticipate over 200 police officers to comprise the unit – 120 of which will be 
detectives.  An additional 10 FBI agents will also complementing the organization 
responsible for Los Angeles’ South Bureau region.  Consequently, all anti-gang 
efforts throughout the city will fall under the purview of a department-wide 
administrator.  In acknowledging Los Angeles’ role in the anti-gang effort and the 
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consequent proposed course of action centering on intelligence sharing, 
Villaraigosa and Bratton laid the foundation for the rest of summit’s agenda.146 
Accordingly, the representatives expanded on the conference’s theme by 
recognizing the need for better communication between North and Central 
American law enforcement agencies.  Attempting to address short-term needs, 
such as intelligence sharing, and long-term preventative solutions, the 
participating members identified four proposals by the summit’s end.  First, the 
countries agreed to the significant need to improve intelligence sharing 
specifically on gang member who use the legal system to travel across borders.  
This is in accordance with a February 5, 2007 announcement made by U.S. 
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales regarding the creation of a Department of 
State-backed Transnational Anti-Gang Unit specifically tailored for the northern 
Central American countries.  Second, summit members proposed a massive anti-
gang media campaign with internationally known celebrity sponsors.  Third, 
governments expressed a desire to establish an exchange program designed for 
mid and high-level law enforcement officers.  The final proposal calls the 
establishment of a gang member database with assistance from the FBI’s NGIC.  
Participating countries plan to derive a “Top 20 Most Wanted Gang Members” 
program to help with international tracking efforts.  Ultimately, the representatives 
plan to present the proposals for consideration at the April 2007 International 
Gang Conference in El Salvador.147   
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G. CONCLUSION 
El Salvador, Honduras, and to a certain extent Guatemala, all appear to 
have answered an immediate need put forth by their constituents.  As described 
above, the regional unemployment and poverty rates played into decisions made 
by at-risk individuals.  Although unemployment and poverty rates both decreased 
throughout the 1990’s, they did so at slow pace.  When these two factors 
combined with nascent democracies more preoccupied with reconstructing their 
political, judicial, and economic infrastructures, vacuums within the system 
inevitably emerge.  Consequently, these gaps become attractive to groups 
aiming to exploit fissures within the governmental process and develop a criminal 
network strong enough to transcend territorial borders.   
Each of these three countries have undertaken radical measures not just 
to end a problem quickly, but ensure its termination and provide resolution their 
constituents security concerns.  This need to rectify a growing public security 
problem, therefore, pressed these governments into action.  As described above, 
however, the means do not necessarily justify the end.   
Based on my research, it seems constituents do want their governments 
to resolve the transnational gang issue and are willing to sacrifice a certain level 
of civil liberties.  When governments do not achieve desired results, though, and 
the actual outcome reflects a much graver situation than before government 
intervention, citizens begin to question whether sacrifices made were necessary.  
While the international arena did not have a direct influence or the initial 
establishment of the anti-mara laws by El Salvador and Honduras, the aftermath 
of Super Mano Dura and Ley Anti-mara does serve as an example to the rest of 
the Central American countries.  Since Nicaragua and Panama do not 
experience the devastating level of gang activity El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Guatemala do, they had the opportunity to observe, analyze, and finally put into 
practice a comprehensive legislation that addressed security concerns while 
protecting civil liberties.    
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In this regard, El Salvador and Honduras – in a sense – have shaped the 
direction their southern neighbors have taken and the path Guatemala is 
attempting to undertake.  The human rights criticism appears to have prompted 
the southern Central American countries to confer with domestic and INGO 
representatives when shaping anti-gang legislation in their own respective 
countries.  Furthermore, recent statistical data regarding Super Mano Dura’s and 
Ley Anti-mara’s  lack of success have served to not only reassure Nicaragua and 
Panama in their decision to follow a multi-faceted approach, but also influence 
Guatemala’s President Berger in seeking out a more human-rights-friendly 
solution to the mara problem.       
Central American countries need to reevaluate whether the current 
punishment fits the crime.  Supporters of the heavy-handed legislation argue for 
the employment of even stricter laws as the only approach suitable for the 
overwhelming transnational gang problem.  If this is the case, it will only be a 
matter of time before regional authorities brand transnational gangs as terrorists 
as was done to narco-traffickers after 9/11.  Calling these gangs terrorists will 
undeniably allow governments to become eligible for counter terrorism funding.  
In an April 2005 testimony before the Committee of International Relations, U.S. 
House of Representative Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, USAID 
Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Adolfo Franco, captured the severity of the gang issue for governments in 
Central America.  Mr. Franco explained, “The Presidents of Honduras and El 
Salvador have called gangs as big a threat to national security in their countries 
as terrorism is to the United States.”148  In view of this severity, political 
supporters of heavy-handed methods consider El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Guatemala are taking too long to react.  Guatemalan President Berger, for 
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example, is currently facing-off with two political parties who advocate a 
formalized legislation strictly favoring law enforcement.149 
When choosing to follow such a strict strategy, governments need to 
remain vigilant of signs indicating their tactics may be hindering civil liberties.  
Unfortunately, as explained in the cases of El Salvador and Honduras, 
government officials did not properly identify these indicators.  The uninhibited 
and highly subjective arrests of youth based on the mere appearance of gang 
lifestyle should have been the first warning.  The virtual witch hunts that 
ultimately overwhelmed the judicial systems in both countries; this should have 
been the second indication.  Government officials should have recognized the 
third sign when the time for releasing arrested gang members without going 
before a judge changed from days to mere hours.  The ultimate indication the 
punishment does not fit the crime should have become apparent when gang 
members entered prison novice recruits and left refined criminals.   
If these four rationales are of any indication, countries need to take a 
multi-faceted approach in attempting to resolve this issue.  A proper plan against 
youth gangs needs to include prevention and intervention aspects to compliment 
law enforcement.  Much like the Nicaraguan model, such a plan needs to target 
at-risk youth early on.  Any new strategy also needs to be flexible to approach 
troubled youth looking to leave the gang life or to reform an already incarcerated 
gang member into a valuable asset to society.  For their part, both El Salvador 
and Honduras are seemingly attempting to completely overhaul their strategies, 
or at the very least modify their current approach, and follow in the footsteps of 
Nicaragua and Panama.   
The first signs of change in Honduras came with the election of Manuel 
Zelaya in 2005.  His platform included, among other issues, a change in the way 
the Honduran government would deal with the gang problem.  While not 
completely doing away with Honduras’ current zero-tolerance anti-gang policy, 
Zelaya is attempting to establish talks with gang leaders, promising the institution 
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of a new rehabilitation program.  In exchange for this move, Zelaya has asked 
gang leaders to instruct members to, “give up their weapons and their criminal 
ways.”150  In what seems to be a direct cue from Nicaragua, Zelaya’s program 
also calls for the allocation of funding towards an increase of the National 
Police’s personnel as well as towards the formation of a neighborhood crime-
watch program for communities throughout the nation.   
Meanwhile, El Salvador’s President Saca has also arrived at the 
conclusion certain changes in combating the mara problem are required.  In June 
2006, the Saca administration unveiled its “Plan Maestro de Seguridad.”  This 
new plan appears to be an attempt at addressing the human rights violations 
accusations that plague both “Mano Dura” and “Super Mano Dura.”  By 
instructing its National Police to be more selective when making arrests, the 
Saca administration expects more emphasis placed on observing the rule of law.  
The administration believes this more nuanced approach will spur more 
investigations that are comprehensive as well as reduce the backlog within the 
judicial system.  Additionally, the plan calls for a restructuring of both the National 
Police and the Attorney General’s office.151 
As for the U.S., national law enforcement entities must continue 
interacting with their respective Central American counterparts.  Application of 
lessons learned from joint operations, such as those that took place in 
September 2005, and continual development must occur.  Assisting with 
additional technical training and operational guidance for both law enforcement 
police institutions as well as judicial personnel will be crucial for Central American 
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governments that have no established foundations in fighting entities with the 
capacity transnational gangs currently posses. 
Ultimately, relying on strong-arm tactics alone is not the answer to the 
transnational gang problem.  There is no argument violent criminal acts are 
morally terrible.  It is very important, nonetheless, for governments to exhaust 
every channel of dialogue in deciding the constitutionality of a given course of 
action.  Heavy-handed anti-gang laws may provide the answer for short-term 
success.  Unfortunately, long-term repercussions to the stability of government 
institutions as well as civil liberties may eventually overshadow any future 




















A. WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRANSNATIONAL GANG-TERRORIST LINK 
IS PLAUSIBLE  
In his article “Al-Qaeda’s Unlikely Allies in Central America,” former 
Salvadoran Diplomat, Carlos Mauricio Pineda Cruz, argues the likelihood of a 
western hemisphere transnational gang-terrorist link is low.  Cruz highlights four 
main reasons why such a connection is doubtful: the decentralized organizational 
structure of gangs like the MS-13; the difference in ideological objectives; the 
widely publicized notoriety of MS-13; and the rejection of seeing the U.S.-
Mexican border as an ideal point of entry into the U.S.152  Given the evidence 
presented throughout this thesis, however, my research offers different views 
that support a conclusion on the possibility of short-term alliances between 
transnational gangs and terrorist organizations within the western hemisphere 
region. 
Skeptics like Cruz who call into doubt the likelihood of a link between 
gangs like MS-13 and terrorists first question the gang’s organizational structure:  
The Maras are not a centralized organization…they are a highly 
decentralized transnational criminal network… they do not have the 
central decision making mechanism to establish a relationship with 
a sophisticated, non indigenous organization like al-Qaeda.153   
This decentralized characteristic may in fact attract terrorists to MS-13.  As 
explained in Chapter II, groups within a decentralized criminal network frequently 
operate with little to no communication between each other; a level of anonymity 
is in place.  Thus, a covert terrorist cell working with any given MS-13 clica may 
do so without alarming the rest of the MS-13 network.  Furthermore, many 
transnational criminal gangs like MS-13 are already operating in a decentralized 
manner.  These MS-13 run networks often are nothing more than “business 
agreements” between local and regional clicas that can be cancelled or altered at 
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any time – depending on the immediate and strategic needs of their operation.  
This established system, therefore, becomes attractive to a terrorist organization 
like al-Qaeda seeking to resolve an immediate logistical need without fear of 
entering into a long-term contract.   
The second argument Cruz raises concerns ideological differences, “The 
Maras do not have an anti-American agenda.”154  While ideology does represent 
a potential reason for MS-13 and terrorists not to work together, it is not the 
deciding factor preventing a MS-13-terrorist collaboration.  Terrorists may 
become involved in minor criminal activities, or use existing networks for 
logistical purposed without ever losing sight of their ultimate ideologically driven 
goal.  Terrorist following the Takfir wal Hijra doctrine, for example, operate 
differently from other radical Islamists.  Their sole aim is to assimilate into their 
surrounding environment, often cutting their beards and donning western-style 
clothing, in order to carry out their operation.  Furthermore, “…Takfiris also 
indulge in petty crime, credit card fraud, and drug dealing to finance their 
activities.”155  
Criminals, like the MS-13, usually do not harbor an anti-American agenda 
like terrorist do.  They are not seeking the overthrow of the U.S. government.  
Rather, MS-13 seeks to exploit government weaknesses through corruption in 
order to ensure their networks flourish.  MS-13 has successfully established 
criminal networks throughout the region that in one form or another come into 
contact with each of the five black markets covered in Chapter II.  Moreover, the 
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success of their illegal doings and their violent tendencies has earned the MS-13 
the right to operate in the region with little threat from rival actors.  Unlike 
terrorists, MS-13 does not hold crime as a means towards a greater end, but 
rather as the end itself.  Therefore, ideology, or loyalty for that matter, does not 
become an obstacle when the subject involves money.   
Cruz’ third point as to why a transnational gang-terrorist link is unlikely 
contends: 
The Maras are a public and widely know organization, which makes 
them unlikely partners for an ultra-secretive network like al-
Qaeda… This is especially the case since many of their members 
are well known to local and federal law enforcement agencies.156 
Normally, criminals do not want undue attention to their actions as it may 
trigger law enforcement reprisal ultimately leading to a potential loss of revenue.  
Consequently, criminals strategically carry out any decisions and subsequent 
actions.  This is especially crucial when employing violence against business 
rivals or prying state officials.  Criminals, therefore, typically prefer to operate in 
society’s shadow – coveting secrecy to secure their business. 
Highly recognized MS-13 activity, however, have attracted the national-
level attention of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and U.S. governments.  El 
Salvador and Honduras have opted for heavy-handed strategies to eradicate the 
gang problem with the implementation of Super Mano Dura and Ley Anti-Mara, 
respectively.  These heavy-handed laws place strong emphasis on law 
enforcement as the primary response to gangs.  The zero-tolerance core of this 
form of legislation extends a certain amount of leeway for police forces to 
question and arrest young men without due process of the law.  Unfortunately, 
the laws remain subjective as to what constitutes a gang member as the mere 
perception of gang activity provides enough justification for law enforcement 
action.    
These hard-line laws have instilled a certain level of fear within gang 
members.  In an effort to survive and avoid the police, MS-13 members are 
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learning to adapt.  New rules, for example, reportedly forbid new recruits from 
acquiring visible tattoos identifying them as MS-13, as is the custom among gang 
associates.  The same holds true with apparel: most MS-13 members now avoid 
wearing “gangster-style” or “hip-hop” clothing, choosing more casual and 
conservative looking attire.  As highlighted by these examples, the repressive 
nature of these current anti-mara laws is forcing gang members “underground.”  
Currently MS-13 leadership does not seem to originate from a central authority 
but rather from within local and regional clicas.  As gang members become more 
reclusive, however, the likelihood they will cooperate and rely on each other to 
survive increases.  Ultimately, the more this new “underground” existence 
continues to develop and take hold throughout the gang, the probability 
increases a formerly acephalous MS-13 may eventually organize around a 
possible leadership node embedded within its criminal network.  If FBI reports of 
alleged multi-clica meetings are any indication, the potential for a higher level of 
organization already exists within the MS-13.157  
Finally, Cruz provides his fourth reason as why a link is improbable: 
Although the U.S.-Mexico border is vulnerable to penetration – a 
reality underscored by the many migrants that cross it every day – 
this fact alone does not make it the first choice of entry to the U.S. 
for al-Qaeda.  The very fact that the border is vulnerable to 
penetration means that it is subject to constant surveillance by a 
multitude of U.S. agencies, including the intelligence community.158 
Cruz concedes in the same article the presence of MS-13 run smuggling 
networks specializing in human, weapons, and drugs among other goods.159  
MS-13 transports these goods via a cargo railroad that stretches from southern 
to northern Mexico.  Recent allegations from the Texas Sheriffs’ Border Coalition 
in 2006, however, highlight entry into the U.S. via Mexico is still a viable option 
for terrorists.  Rather than attempting to cross the border as individuals fitting 
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established terrorist profiles, potential terrorist are reportedly attempting to 
assimilate within the Hispanic culture.  Terrorists may be learning Spanish, 
dressing, and behaving like locals.  Sheriff Sigifredo Gonzalez of Zapata County, 
Texas explains, "To avoid apprehension, we feel many of these terrorists attempt 
to blend in with persons of Hispanic origin when entering the country.”160  
Supporting this claim is the continual collection of questionable objects, such as 
“…Iranian currency, military badges in Arabic, jackets and other clothing,”161 
found around known human smuggling hotspots along the border.  Gonzalez 
describes articles found around such a hotspot in Jim Hogg County, Texas, “We 
see patches on jackets from countries where we know al Qaeda to be active.”162 
Currently, MS-13 members “own” the eastern Mexican train route that 
runs from Chiapas to Tabasco, through Veracruz and into northern Mexico; 90 
percent of these are freight trains.163  In the wake of the dismantling of the 
Mexican and Peruvian alien-smuggling rings mentioned in Chapter II, MS-13 has 
emerged as a primary purveyor for human smuggling within the Central 
American/Southern Mexico region.  Hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens, 
mostly from Mexico and other Latin American countries, enter the U.S. through 
Mexico in order to seek a better life.  While the majority of these illegal 
immigrants do not carry anti-American beliefs, the possibility exists for illegal 
aliens harboring anti- U.S. ideologies to enter our country as well.  Consequently, 
the Department of Homeland Security reports authorities apprehended 
approximately 90,000 illegal aliens from countries known to be involved with 
terrorism between 2001 and 2005.164  As MS-13 controls the majority of the 
railways through Mexico, prospective illegal aliens – to include potential terrorists 
– would likely have to use this particular smuggling network in order to reach the 
U.S.   
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given the evidence presented, I conclude a strategic link between terrorist 
and organized criminals is more likely than a long-term partnership.  Terrorists 
and criminals are most likely to cooperate in areas where the other has a 
comparative advantage.  A marriage of convenience therefore ensues where 
agreements are not binding but rather momentary – be it a one-time event or 
lasting as long as both individuals who initiated the agreement honor their pact. 
Regional and independent country action must continue in order to 
eliminate and ultimately prevent an environment leading to an MS-13-terrorist 
link.  Central American countries need to continue to work together as well as 
closely monitor the constitutionality of anti-gang legislation adopted as it applied 
to their government.  Failure to do so may incur human rights violations against 
the particular government.  An attempt to address the human rights violations 
charges that plague previous El Salvador legislation seems to be occurring with 
its 2006 Plan Maestro de Seguridad. Similarly, Honduras’ new president, Manuel 
Zelaya is also making efforts to overhaul current anti-mara legislation by 
allocating funds towards an increase in National Police personnel as well as the 
formation of a neighborhood crime-watch program for communities throughout 
the nation.    
Ultimately, choosing to ignore the civil liberties issue will only serve to 
motivate MS-13 into using political violence against the government.  Therefore, 
Central American countries need to seriously consider and follow through with a 
multi-faceted strategy.  Currently, the heavy-handed approach is only 
encouraging MS-13 and similar transnational gangs to go “underground.”  In 
doing this, these gangs will be forced to organize – relying on each other in order 
to survive.  Where fractures and decentralization once existed, heavy-handed 
legislation will only serve to consolidate western hemisphere transnational gangs.  
When these gangs fully switch to a complete “underground” existence, they will 
become even more attractive to potential terrorist collaborators. 
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In the U.S., domestic interagency cooperation must continue: the success 
of future operations depends on continual gang-related information and 
intelligence sharing between U.S. law enforcement agencies and their regional 
counterparts.  Application of lessons learned and continual development must 
occur.  This same U.S. approach must serve as the model for law enforcement 
entities in the region.  Technical training and additional operational guidance will 
be required for Central American governments that have no established 
foundations in fighting a gang with the capacity MS-13 and other transnational 
gangs currently posses. 
A great opportunity for this to take place may happen with the International 
Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), based in El Salvador’s capital, San Salvador.  
ILEA San Salvador was the result of the Bilateral Agreement signed by the U.S. 
and El Salvador on September 20, 2005 and ratified by the Salvadoran National 
Assembly on November 30, 2005.  The academy’s purpose is to provide 
formalized law enforcement training for national police institutions as well as 
criminal justice authorities in the region.  Much success is expected from ILEA 
San Salvador; however, it is still too early to gauge results.  The simple act of 
standing up the ILEA in El Salvador will yield long-term results for the U.S.  Since 
2004, an allegation of a possible MS-13 and al-Qaeda link has emerged.  
Although no tangible proof has surfaced, any cooperation generated by ILEA will 
allow the U.S. to monitor this claim more closely.165    
As mentioned before, relying on strong-arm tactics alone is not the answer 
to the transnational gang problem.  Regional governments need to exhaust every 
channel of communication in deciding the constitutionality and effectiveness of a 
given course of action.  Heavy-handed anti-gang laws may provide the answer  
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for short-term success.  Long-term repercussions of ignoring a multi-faceted 
approach, however, may eventually overshadow any future progress made 
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